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After keeping Turkey on the waiting list for at least four decades, Brussels finally opened the 
accession negotiations with Turkey on the 3rd of October 2005. This decision has not been a 
process without difficulties, and even until one day before the negotiations had to be 
symbolically opened, it remained uncertain whether the foreign ministers of the European 
Union (EU) were able to come to agreement. Main obstacle was the firm attitude of the 
Austrian minister of foreign affairs Plassnik, who consistently opposed a possible Turkish 
EU-accession and instead opted for a looser association without the explicit perspective of 
full EU membership. However, the Turkish Prime-Minister severely opposed this option of a 
‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey and stated that ‘anything besides full EU Membership is 
unacceptable’ (Turkish Press Review, September 2005). After intense bilateral negotiations 
between the EU Presidency (which was then held by the United Kingdom (UK)) and Austria, 
and interference of the United States (US), the – at that time – 25 EU member-states finally 
ended the long-lasting deadlock. Hence, as mandated by the European Council during the 
summit of December 2004, the EU officials agreed upon the text of a ‘negotiating 
framework’, consisting of the ground rules for the negotiation process between the EU and 
Turkey. Yet still, whereas such a negotiation process usually leads to an offer of full 
membership, it has been made explicitly clear that with respect to Turkey ‘these negotiations 
are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’ 
(Negotiating Framework for Turkey 2005: 1).  
 
During the process, the Dutch government had been an important advocate of Turkey’s bid 
for EU-membership. In fact, the Dutch Prime-Minister Balkenende and minister of foreign 
affairs Bot played an important mediating role during the European Council summit on the 
16th and 17th of December in 2004, when under the Dutch Presidency agreement was reached 
upon the conditions to start the negotiations with Turkey on the 3rd of October in 2005. In 
fact, completely in line with the recommendations of the European Commission (European 
Commission 2004), the Dutch government has consistently declared that when Turkey 
sufficiently fulfils the political Copenhagen criteria, it would have no objections to start the 
accession talks. Hence, after the Council agreement of October 2005, the Dutch delegation 
expressed their support for the reached agreement. This supportive attitude was confirmed 
by the Dutch state secretary of European Affairs Nicolaï, who stated that: ‘The EU, with 
Turkey inside it, will be stronger in the fight against terrorism and more influential in 
transatlantic relations’ and ‘the EU leaders shouldn’t hesitate about Turkey’s membership’ 




Whereas the Dutch government formally took on a supportive position towards Turkey 
during the European Council in December 2004, it is remarkable that the agreement to open 
the negotiations by the end of 2005 has led to considerable dissent in the Dutch public arena. 
According to Eurobarometer public opinion polls, only 39% of the Dutch citizens were fully in 
favour of a Turkish accession to the EU, whereas 53% said to be against (European 
Commission 2005a). Moreover, following opinion polls from the Dutch public opinion 
researcher de Hond (2005a), 52% of the Dutch citizens firmly disagreed with the decision to 
start the accession talks with Turkey in October 2005, and another 52% said to be dissatisfied 
with the way in which the Dutch government handled the issue. In addition, an in-depth 
study of the motivations behind the Dutch rejection of the European Constitution on the 1st of 
June 2005 shows that the possibility of a Turkish EU-Membership was one of the issues that 
citizens seemed to have taken into consideration when making up their mind about their vote 
(Thomassen 2005: 64, in: Aarts en van der Kolk 2005).   
 
This scepticism of the Dutch public towards the possible Turkish EU-accession can be 
considered remarkable. It has been argued that citizens of the EU founding member-states 
were characterized by a so-called ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), 
supportive of most EU-policies and relying on the political elites in driving the integration 
process forward. As a result, Dutch EU policies were traditionally being depoliticized and 
technocratized and the Dutch citizenry was usually not very interested in expressing its point 
of view. However, given the current lack of Dutch public support for Turkey’s possible EU 
membership, it can be questioned whether the traditional way of Dutch EU policy-making 
still offers legitimate policy-decisions, and whether the position of the Dutch government to 
support the December-2004 agreement was being sufficiently legitimized. 
 
The question comes up whether a better political and/or societal embedding of the Turkish 
issue could have turned around either Dutch public opinion or the position and actions of the 
Dutch government, so that the apparent gap between the government and the Dutch public 
would have been minimized of even solved. However, taken into consideration the lack of 
public support for a Turkish accession that is currently present in most EU-countries, it 
cannot be ignored that the possibility of Turkey’s EU-Membership touches upon such 
fundamental issues that it might be that Dutch politicians would never have been able to 
successfully communicate their point of view to their electorate. As such, the mismatch 
between the Dutch government and citizens raises questions not only about the extent to 
which the issue was embedded in Dutch politics and society, but also about the character of 
this political and societal embedding and the specific issues related to Turkey’s possible 
accession that are perceived as fundamental within the Dutch political and public debate.  
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Hence, the research question of this paper is fourfold: 
1) How did the position of the Dutch government to support the December-
2004 agreement on Turkey develop?  
2) How has the question of Turkey’s possible EU-Membership been perceived 
by the Dutch public and the media?  
3) To what extent were there legitimacy problems concerning the formal 
Dutch position regarding Turkey’s aspiration to join the EU? 
4) Could a different type of embedding of the issue of the possible Turkish 
accession have led to a more legitimized position of the Dutch government? 
 
The first question will be addressed in paragraph 3, which provides an overview of the way in 
which the Dutch position came into being and how the decision-making process on Turkey 
evolved. Paragraph 4 focuses on the second question, in which an analysis will be conducted 
on the character of both the Dutch public and media debate. In order to determine the 
specificness of the character of the Dutch debate, paragraph 5 offers a comparison between 
the Turkey-debate in the Netherlands and the political and societal debate on this issue in 
two other EU-countries, namely Germany and the UK. Finally, questions 3 and 4 will be 
addressed in paragraph 6, in which it will be outlined whether the Dutch EU policy-making 
regarding Turkey suffered from apparent legitimacy problems and some insights will be 
provided on the question of what might have prevented these problems. However, first, in the 
next paragraph an overview will be presented of the historical context of the December 2004 
decision to open the accession negotiations on the 3rd of October 2005, and the obstacles and 

















2 HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
The relationship between the EU and Turkey is characterized by a long history and started in 
1963, when Turkey officially became an associate member of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Moreover, this relationship is characterized by sequences of ups and 
downs and after a long period of uncertainty with which both Turkey and the EU had to deal, 
an important step forward was made at the time when the accession negotiations were 
officially opened in October 2005. Yet, the path to full membership can still be considered 
long and depends on Turkey’s fulfilment of some important accession requirements. In fact, 
Brussels has made it explicitly clear that if Turkey will ever become a full EU-member, this 
will not take place before 2014 at the earliest (Negotiation Framework for Turkey 2005: 5).   
 
To understand the difficulties surrounding the Turkey-EU relations, this section provides a 
short overview of the main events during the process that started in the early 1960s and got 
more geared towards a membership-perspective with the agreement to open the accession 
negotiations on the 3rd of October in 2005 (see Table 1 for short time-line). In addition, as 
concerns are being expressed about the possible impacts of a Turkish accession, it is 
necessary to shed some light on the main contextual issues that are attached to Turkey’s EU 
membership, and how these issues relate to the general debate on EU enlargement.  
 
2.1 History of EU-Turkey relations 
The history of the EU-Turkey relationship dates back to 1963, when Turkey signed the 
Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC), which provided 
Turkey with a first membership perspective. However, during the 1970s Turkey’s political 
and economic situation was characterized by problems in terms of instability, civil unrest and 
the Cyprus-crisis, which resulted in a problematic drawback in the EU-Turkey relationship. 
In the 1980s, the relations between Brussels and Turkey were temporarily frozen, after a 
military coup d’état in the early 1980s. Yet, after considerable economic and political 
structural reforms, Turkey officially applied for full EC-Membership in 1987. Whereas the EC 
declared that at that time, Turkey was not yet ready to join the Community, the EC chose the 
strategic position of keeping the relations with Turkey strong by wishing to set up a Customs 
Union with Turkey, when at the time postponing full membership (Erdogdu 2002: 4). This 
Customs Union was set up in 1995, enabling the free movement of goods between the two 
entities. In 1999, the EU-Turkey relationship obtained a new character, when Turkey was 
granted the official EU candidate status. This decision indicated that the question of whether 
Turkey could in principle join the EU was positively answered by the governments of the EU 




Table 1: Time-line EU-Turkey relations 1963-2005 
1963 Turkey signs Association-Agreement with the EEC 
1974 Turkey invades Cyprus after failure of diplomatic efforts to solve the 
problem between Greece and Turkey 
1980 The Turkish army gains the power, as reaction the EU freezes all relations 
with Turkey 
1983 Turkish-Cyprus declares its independence and ends its military rule 
1987 Turkey officially applies for EU-membership 
1989 The EU declares that Turkey is not ready for accession 
1995 The EU and Turkey set up a Customs Union 
1997 The EU declares that the ten Central and Eastern European countries can 
join the Union, but that Turkey is still not ready. Turkey freezes the 
relations with the EU 
1999 The European Council officially recognizes Turkey as official candidate for 
EU-membership 
2001 The EU formally asks Turkey to limit the political power of the Turkish 
army 
2002 Election of the AKP government (of Prime-Minister Erdogan),  under 
which Turkey has undergone considerable political reforms
2004 Turkey signs Treaty to abolish death penalty 
October: European Commission presents positive report on Turkey’s 
political reforms 
December: European Council decides that the accession negotiations with 
Turkey are to be officially opened on the 3rd of October 2005
2005 October: accession talks with Turkey symbolically opened
 
Hence, the Turkish perspective towards an EU-Membership indicated a slow and steady 
progress. During the European Council in Copenhagen in 2002, it was concluded that ‘if the 
European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from 
the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European 
Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay’ (Presidency Conclusions 
Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002: 5).  This recommendation-report 
was provided by the Commission in October 2004 and was considerably positive towards 
Turkey’s progress on the political Copenhagen criteria. It presented a three-dimensional 
strategy of reinforcing and supporting the reform process in Turkey, setting out the 
indications for the conduct of accession negotiations and strengthening the dialogue between 
the European Union and Turkey (European Commission 2004). 
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As a result of this positive Commission-report, the Dutch EU-Presidency was able to 
conclude that ‘the European Council welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its 
far-reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that 
process of reform. Furthermore, it expects Turkey to actively pursue its efforts to bring into 
force the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission’ and that ‘in the light of 
the above and of the Commission report and recommendation, Turkey sufficiently fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations provided that it brings into force 
these specific pieces of legislation’ (Presidency Conclusions Brussels European Council, 16 
and 17 December 2004: 6). On the basis of a negotiating framework which was approved by 
the then 25 EU member-states and Turkey, and which consists of the ground rules for the 
negotiation process, accession negotiations were finally opened on the 3rd of October 2005. 
Yet, as stated in the framework: ‘These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome 
of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’ (Negotiating Framework Turkey 2005: 1).  
 
2.2 Turkey’s EU-Membership and the EU’s ‘Enlargement Fatigue’ 
The political and public debate on the possible EU-accession of Turkey and the concerns that 
are being expressed with respect to the question of whether Turkey is able to join the EU, 
reflect broader doubts about EU enlargement in general (Economist 2005a). Whereas 
previous enlargement rounds are perceived as being truly European success stories, it seems 
as if the EU is losing its appetite for further enlargement. Brussels suspended the first stage 
of the accession talks with Serbia, and whereas both countries eventually joined the EU by 
the beginning of this year, the decision on the EU-accessions of Bulgaria and Rumania had 
been gradually postponed. In fact, after the accession of the ten Central and Eastern 
European countries, and especially after the public rejection of the European Constitutional 
Treaty in France and the Netherlands, many EU member-states are faced with growing 
concerns on the future and limits of European enlargement (Economist 2005b). Recent 
public opinion polls of the Eurobarometer also show that European citizens are becoming 
more critical towards further EU expansion, as in the autumn of 2005 only 49% of the 
respondents in the 25 current member states are in favour of further enlargement (European 
Commission 2005b: 29).  
 
As the recent Eastward enlargement shifted the EU borders far to the East, concerns are 
expressed about the finality of EU expansion and questions are raised about whether the 
borders of the EU should coincide with the borders of the European continent, while leaving 
unanswered the question of where these borders are situated (Zielonka 2002: 1). According 
to the EU Constitutional Treaty ‘the Union shall be open to all European states which respect 
its values and are committed to promoting them together’ (Article 1 Constitutional Treaty). 
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However, it could be argued that it remains unclear what – geographically, historically or 
culturally – defines a European state, and hence, the EU seems to be unable to outline the 
finality of its expansion. As Zielonka (2002: 7) argues: ‘On the one hand, there is no ‘natural’ 
border of Europe based on history, geography or culture that the Union could simply adopt as 
originally stipulated by the Treaty of Rome. On the other hand, fixing borders through a 
process of political bargaining is complex, costly and conflict-ridden’.  
 
Already in 1993, the EU member-states made an attempt to overcome these problems by 
developing formal criteria on the basis of which it could be determined whether or not a 
country can join the EU. According to these Copenhagen-criteria, EU enlargement depends 
on a country’s fulfilment of certain political requirements as having a well functioning 
democracy, rule of law and respect for human and minorities rights; the fulfilment of the 
economic criterion of having a well functioning market-economy; and a country’s full 
implementation of the acquis.  However, as the EU has expanded its vision further to the 
East with the start of the accession negotiations with Turkey, and in addition, Albania, Serbia 
and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina as potential future candidate countries, 
questions are raised about whether these criteria form a sufficient basis to decide whether a 
country is inherently European and whether it could in principle become an EU-member. 
 
In fact, as the debate on the possible accession of Turkey shows, despite such well defined 
and clearly stated criteria, Turkey is being evaluated in a much more critical and strict way, 
and the debate on Turkey’s bid for EU-Membership is obscured by concerns that even go 
beyond these objective accession criteria (Boudewijn en van Grinsven 2004: 437). In order to 
contextualize and balance the debate on Turkey’s EU-membership, this paragraph offers an 
overview of the argumentations that are being adopted by both the advocates and opponents 
of Turkey’s EU-accession.  
 
Geography  
As the debate on the geographical borders of Europe has not been solved, there remains 
considerable confusion about whether Turkey geographically belongs to the European 
continent. Whereas Turkey was accepted into the Atlantic Alliance – which would suggest 
that Turkey is believed to be positioned on the European continent – Turkey was also 
accepted into the Central Treaty Organization, which stretches eastwards across Iraq and 
Iran to Pakistan (Wallace 2002, in: Zielonka 2002: 79). This confusion about the continental 
positioning of Turkey has made opponents of a Turkish accession argue that Turkey is not 
fully European in geographical terms, but only slightly European, as the largest part of 
Turkey is situated on the Asian continent.  
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Democratization and Human Rights 
In the period leading up to the December-2004 agreement, most emphasis was being put on 
Turkey’s fulfilment of the political Copenhagen-criterion. As stated, the political criterion 
requires that a candidate state must have the institutions to preserve and protect democratic 
governance, rule of law, human rights and minority rights. As the Commission published a 
positive report on Turkey’s progress on these policy areas (European Commission 2005c), 
accession negotiations with Turkey have been opened in October 2005. Whereas this would 
imply that with respect to these issues, Turkey meets the European standards, concerns are 
still raised about the actual implementation and the functioning of Turkey’s adopted laws. In 
addition, continuous difficulties as Turkey’s consistent refusal to recognize the Armenian 
genocide in the beginning of the 20th century and continuous violations of the Kurdish 
minority rights have resulted in principle objections against Turkey’s EU membership.   
 
In addition, the Cyprus question remains to play a significant role in both the political and 
public debate. In fact, Cyprus has been – and still is – one of the main obstacles to the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey, as Turkey continues to refuse the formal 
recognition of the state of Cyprus. Whereas the Ankara-agreement for setting up a Customs-
Union between Turkey and the EU member-states of course implicitly requires the 
recognition on behalf of Turkey, problems are not solved, as for many countries it remains 
inadmissible that Turkey does not recognize all members of the Union.  
 
Institutions 
Another central issue in the enlargement-debate is the concern that EU-expansion will make 
the EU politically and institutionally unmanageable. For example Christian Noyer, former 
vice-President of the European Central Bank (ECB), stated that an enlarged EU faces severe 
problems in terms of decision-making, as the interests of ‘newcomers’ may diverse 
significantly from the existing member-states (Noyer 2000: 1). This concern was one of the 
main motivations behind the last id for EU Treaty reform with the Constitutional Treaty. As 
the Laeken Declaration clearly states, the main challenge that the EU faces is how to ‘improve 
the efficiency of decision-making and the workings of the institutions in a Union of some 
thirty Member States’. These concerns tap into the ‘deepening and widening’ debate of the 
EU, as it is feared that ‘an enlarged European Union might lead to a standstill in integration 
or even an unravelling of the degree of deepening achieved so far’ (Noyer 2000: 2). In fact, 
with the French and Dutch public rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, future 
enlargement could imply serious risks of overstretch as it would be the first time that the EU 
is faced with ‘widening’ without any perspective on ‘deepening’ within the near future. 
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The political-institutional concerns about the absorption power of the EU are extremely 
relevant when it comes to the debate on the accession of Turkey, as negotiations with Turkey 
are shaped by ‘the Union’s capacity to absorb Turkey’ (Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 
2005: 3). Hence, whereas this condition was not explicitly set during the 1993 Copenhagen 
summit, the ability of the EU to remain effective and coherent after enlargement, is set as 
additional criterion when it comes to the accession of Turkey. As Turkey would become the 
EU’s largest member state in population terms, soon after accession (Hughes 2004: ii), 
concerns are being expressed about the political institutional impacts. Questions are raised of 
whether the Union is ready for such a big country to join (Economist 2005c), and what the 
impact will be on the voting procedures in the Council and the European Parliament 
(Boudewijn en van Grinsven 2004: 437).  
 
Geo-Politics 
An important argument of the advocates of Turkey’s EU-membership, for example expressed 
by President of the US, has been the possible bridge-function that Turkey could fulfil between 
the EU and the Middle East (Boudewijn en van Grinsven 2004: 436). Hence, following this 
argument, it is exactly because of Turkey’s borders with the Middle-East, Caucasus and the 
Black Sea that it could fulfil a bridge-function, which will increase the Union’s range of 
interests in these ‘difficult’ regions (Hughes 2004: ii). In addition, as the EU’s enlargement 
policy is considered to fulfil an important pushing role in Turkey’s process of 
democratization, it is believed that Turkey’s democratic reforms might spill-over to the 
Middle-East, creating more stability and security in the region. 
 
However, there is no consensus with respect to this line of reasoning and the same geo-
political argumentation is used by opponents to point out that Turkey should not join the EU 
because of the geopolitical challenges of Turkey’s continental positioning. As Guérot, official 
from the German Marshall Funds of the US has stated: ‘Further enlargements would bring 
the EU to the border of some unstable and dangerous regions and, thus, create a need and 




Whereas Turkey has accomplished considerable economic progress, widespread poverty and 
regional inequality are two main challenges that the country faces and Turkey does not yet 
fully meet the economic Copenhagen criterion of having a well functioning market economy 
(Hughes 2004: 10). This has raised concerns about the economic impact of a Turkish 
accession. It is feared that the accession of Turkey would be extremely costly for the current 
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EU Member-States, as Turkey’s economic situation will make it eligible for significant budget 
transfers from the Union (Hughes 2004: ii). It is for this reason that Guérot comes to argue 
that ‘Turkey can be a member of a geo-strategic EU, but not of the redistributive EU as it 
exists now’ (Guérot 2004: 2).  
 
However, in its advice to the Dutch government, the AIV stated that whereas the macro-
effects of a Turkish accession would be limited, the micro-positive-effects would be 
considerable as regional trade and investment will grow (AIV 2004: 22). In addition, the SER 
(2004) published a report on the economic implications of a Turkish accession, and came to 
the conclusion that from a socio-economic perspective, there are no serious objections to a 
Turkish EU-accession. In particularly, the EU could benefit from the young Turkish 
population, as many EU member-states are faced with a growing ageing population. Yet, 
whereas potential migration could be seen as a positive effect of the Turkish accession, 
migration is a sensitive political issue in the former EU-15, with ‘public opinion easily stirred 
against it’ (Hughes 2004: 16). Whereas many European leaders have stated that with respect 
to Turkey, there might be long transition periods to some policy-areas (i.e. free movement of 
persons) concerns about huge migration flows from Turkey to the richer European member-
states are still deeply rooted (European Commission 2005a: 161).  
 
Culture 
It could however be argued that the debate on Turkey has been predominantly shaped by 
cultural motivations. In fact, as official criteria such as geography or the economic and 
political Copenhagen criteria seem to provide no definite answer to the question of whether 
Turkey could be considered as a European state allowed to join the EU, other criteria such as 
Turkey’s history and culture, play an extremely important role in the discussion on Turkey’s 
bid for EU-Membership. In this context, opponents of a Turkish accession refer to 
Huntington, who has argued that cultural norms and values are important for the 
effectiveness and survival of any form of regional cooperation, as they provide feelings of 
mutual trust on which cooperation is essentially based (Huntington 2003: 139). According to 
this view, the EU derives its existence from the shared norms and values that it inhibits, and 
on the basis of which the identity of its members is formed. With respect to the question on 
the borders of Europe and the limits of EU expansion, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, 
Olli Rehn, seems to share this cultural perspective, as he stated that ‘the map of Europe is 
defined in the mind, not just on the ground. Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it 




In his book ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Huntington (c.f. 1996, 2003), provides a clear 
benchmark to determine these European borders, as he states that ‘Europe ends where 
Western Christianity ends and where the Islam and Orthodox Christianity begin’ (1996: 170). 
In fact, Huntington points to a ‘clash’ between the Christian Western civilization and the 
Islamic civilization, as the Islamic tradition is argued to be inherently incompatible with 
Western norms and values as democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights (2003: 
199). And indeed, the Huntington-thesis has been consistently interpreted to motivate that 
Turkey – with a predominantly Muslim population – does not belong to the EU.  
 
As widespread as this argumentation may be, the question is whether it can be appropriately 
applied to Turkey’s EU-accession. Even if the EU has long left the stage of being a mere 
functional form of international cooperation, it constitutes at most an (imperfect) political 
Union and not a cultural ‘community of values’ as such. While some argue that a shared 
European identity is required to sustain the EU as a political community, it is clear that at 
present this is absent, as the current EU member-states seem more heterogeneous than a 
‘community of values’ would allow. As indicated in article 6.1 of the TEU: ‘The Union is 
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’. These are 
political principles that appear independent from specific culture or religion. Such a reading 
is reinforced by article 10 of the EU Charter of Basic Rights that asserts the ‘freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion’. Indeed, Burgdorf (2004) even argues that exactly these 
fundamental political principles that are so expressly embraced by the Union would be put at 
stake were it to neglect its moral duty to fulfil its previous promises towards Turkey. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this section, concerns about Turkey’s EU membership were placed within the context of 
the more general debate on EU-enlargement and emphasis has been put on specific issues at 
stake when discussing Turkey’s chances of becoming an EU member. Notwithstanding the 
official accession criteria, it became clear that Turkey is being evaluated on many other 
criteria that have no clear role in the formal decision-making. In fact, whereas the question of 
whether Turkey inherently belongs to Europe was already answered during the 1993 Helsinki 
summit, this issue is still raising many principle concerns within the public and political 
debate. In addition, although religion should not be a benchmark according the European 
Treaties, questions are being raised about the compatibleness of the Turkish Islamic tradition 
with the European values.  Moreover, the fact that such issues as geography and religion 
remain to play an important role within the political and public debate on Turkey, suggests 
that these are persistent and of a more principle nature.  
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3 THE EMBEDDING OF TURKEY’S EU-MEMBERSHIP IN DUTCH 
POLITICS 
As citizens of the EU’s founding member-states were long characterized by a so-called 
‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) and mainly relied on the political 
elites in developing their opinion on European issues, Dutch EU policies were long 
depoliticized and technocratized and agreed upon without thorough public consultation and 
contestation. However, in the months before and after the Referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty, concerns were being raised about this way of Dutch EU policy-making, 
and it was suggested that the Dutch political elites could no longer be supportive of all EU 
policy, without taken into account concerns of its electorates (Thomassen 2005: 64-65). In 
fact, as currently the Dutch public does not seem to be very supportive of Turkey’s possible 
EU membership and the issue of Turkey seems to be deeply ‘embedded’ and contested within 
Dutch public debate, it could be questioned whether traditional processes of depoliticization 
still offer legitimate decisions on this specific issue of the Turkish EU-accession.  
 
According to Hix (2006, in: Hix and Bartolini 2006: 10) politicization of European issues has 
some important positive side-effects by enhancing the accountability and legitimacy of the 
EU. In fact, political competition allows citizens to identify the leading and rival policy 
positions of the political elites and provides them with choice, which could be seen as a 
precondition for the democratic process. As Hix claims: ‘Without battles and the potential of 
losing, citizens cannot distinguish between rival leaders, and so cannot work out which 
leaders they sympathise with, and so hope will win the battle, and which they loathe, and so 
hope will lose’ (Hix 2006, in: Hix and Bartolini 2006: 10).  Following this line of 
argumentation, it would be interesting to identify the level of politicization of the Turkish 
issue within the Dutch political arena. Therefore, the focus of this paragraph is twofold. In 
the first section an in-depth analysis will be provided of the way in which the government 
position to support the start of the accession talks came into being. Secondly, it will be 
identified whether the Dutch political parties in general provided the Dutch electorate with 
clear choices, and hence, whether clear political battles on the Turkish issue did take place.  
 
3.1 The position of the Dutch Government  
As decided during the Copenhagen summit on the 13th of December 2002, the EU had to 
agree upon a date on which the accession negotiations were to be started by the end of 2004 
– provided that at that date, Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the political Copenhagen criteria. 
Knowing that at that time, the Netherlands would hold the EU Presidency, the Dutch Prime-
Minister Balkenende – who was not very supportive of explicitly setting a date on which 
negotiations could start, and consistently declared that Turkey must first meet the political 
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Copenhagen criteria (Wynia 2005: 2) –   knew beforehand that he had to shoulder the 
responsibility to make a big step forward in the Turkey-EU relations. Yet, the role of the EU-
Presidency put the Dutch delegation into an ambiguous position, as on the one hand being 
the guardian of the national interests and obliged to take into account public opinion, and on 
the other hand, of being responsible to lead the December negotiations to a successful end. 
And indeed, the role of EU-Presidency provided the Dutch delegation with an advantageous 
bargaining position in the decision-making process on the EU-level, by putting pressure on 
the Commission to include some of the Dutch cabinet’s reserves1 with regard to Turkey’s 
progress on the political and economic Copenhagen criteria in its October- report (Wynia 
2005: 3). However, the fact that Balkenende was responsible for the EU-agreement on 
Turkey, made it legitimate for him to be selective towards public opinion, as at all time 
during the EU-negotiations, the Dutch reputation as consensus-builder was at stake.   
 
This ambiguous and advantageous double position of the Dutch Prime-Minister during the 
EU decision-making process enabled the Dutch government to await the Commission’s 
report on Turkey in October 2004 and to not express any political position on the issue 
before that time. In fact, coming up with an explicit Dutch strategy on Turkey could have 
seriously undermined the Dutch bargaining position during its Presidency, as the Dutch 
cabinet was deeply divided on the Turkish issue. In fact, as a report of the European Stability 
Institute (ESI) (2006) concludes, the Dutch (governmental) debate on Turkey is best 
understood as a process of consensus-building, which resulted in a very moderate position 
towards Turkey’s EU-membership – known as the ‘strict but fair approach’ (ESI 2006: 2) – 
of supporting an eventual Turkish EU accession, but at the same time critically monitoring 
and assessing the progress that the country makes with respect to the Copenhagen criteria.  
 
Indeed, in the period between February and December 2004, the accession of Turkey has 
been point of severe discussion within the Dutch cabinet (Wynia 2005: 3), as the Dutch 
ministers firmly disagreed on the question of whether the EU should open negotiations with 
Turkey in the nearby future. Main supporter of Turkey’s EU-membership was Dutch Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Bot, who had been ambassador in Ankara from 1986 to 1989 and retained 
strong ties with the country (ESI Report 2006: 3). Bot was assisted by his colleague, state 
secretary of European Affairs, Atzo Nicolaï, who was also considerably supportive of a 
Turkish EU-membership. Nicolaï consistently stated that because of the long history that 
Turkey and the EU member-states share, it would be improper if the negotiations would not 
be followed up by eventual membership (Nicolaï 2004a). In a speech at the symposium 
‘Turkey and the EU: Looking Beyond Prejudice’ on the 4th of April 2004, Nicolaï clearly 
outlined the position that the Dutch cabinet would carry out during the summit in December 
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of that year, stating that: ‘Turkey can count on the Netherlands, during its Presidency, to do 
its utmost to ensure a fair and objective decision. Religion will not be an issue. Our motto will 
be, “a deal is a deal” ’ (Nicolaï 2004b:  4).  
 
However, despite of these promising words, other members of the Dutch cabinet were not 
convinced by this message, and some even consistently opposed a Turkish accession. 
Whereas Veerman (Agriculture) and de Geus (Social Affairs) – both members of the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDA) – argued that the accession of such a big Islamic country 
as Turkey was inconsistent with the with the European Christian heritage, Remkes (Internal 
Affairs), Hoogevorst (Health Policy) and Zalm (Financial Affairs) – all members of the VVD – 
opposed a Turkish accession out of economic motivations, as they feared the possibility of 
huge migration flows from Turkey to the current EU member-states and extremely high costs 
for the richer EU member-states (Volkskrant 2004b: 2).   
 
To some extent, it is remarkable that the divisions within the Dutch cabinet were crosscutting 
the parties themselves, and hence, a clash between the parties did not take place. 
Nonetheless, Prime-Minister Balkenende faced a serious problem with not having his cabinet 
on one line, as agreement on Turkey had to be reached during the December summit. Within 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), Balkenende had to take away the principal concerns 
about Turkish Islamic tradition. In a speech to the EP, Balkenende moved away from these 
concerns and stated that: ‘We must not allow ourselves to be guided by fear, e.g. of Islam. 
Raising barriers to any particular religion does not fit in with Europe's shared values. Our 
opposition should be directed not against religions but against people and groups misusing 
their religion to get their way by force. Islam is not the problem. Muslims, Christians and 
people of other beliefs can live together perfectly well. The problem is not religion but misuse 
of religion to sow hatred and intolerance and to repress women’ (Balkenende 2004: 6). This 
vision was shared by state secretary Nicolaï, who stated that: ‘the dividing line between 
Christianity and Islam does not coincide with the borders of Europe’ (Nicolaï 2004b: 2). 
 
To some extent, the clear rejection of religion as criteria against which Turkey should be 
judged, has been clearly formed by a report of the WRR ‘The European Union, Turkey and 
the Islam’, published in June 2004, which took up the question of whether the fact that the 
majority of the Turkish population is Muslim, raises barriers for the accession of Turkey into 
the EU. Basic conclusion of the WRR advice is that it is improper to exclude Turkey of 
membership on the basis of religious motivations (WRR 2004: 166). In addition, practical 
concerns that played a role in the political and public debate about Turkey’s fulfilment of the 
political and economic criteria, as also expressed by some of the ministers, were indeed taken 
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up by the Dutch government. In fact, in a letter to the Dutch Parliament, Bot and Nicolaï 
spoke out their appreciation towards the Commission-report – published in October – and 
agreed on the special criteria – as long transition periods with respect to some policy-areas, 
as for example the free movement of labour – that were requested by the Commission (TK 
23987, nr. 41). In addition, both the AIV (Advisory Council on International Affairs) (2004) 
and the SER (Social Economic Council) (2004) published reports on the economic 
implications of a Turkish accession, and came to the conclusion that from a socio-economic 
perspective, there would be no serious objections to a Turkish accession.  
 
As the December summit approached, divisions within the Dutch cabinet were restrained, 
and consensual agreement was reached on the conditions by which the Dutch cabinet was 
willing to support the start of the negotiations.  In a speech to the EP Balkenende stated that 
‘the decision must be arrived at honestly, under the ground rules to which we previously, in 
2002, firmly committed ourselves. That means strict application of the criteria laid down, but 
without inventing any new criteria’ (Balkenende 2004:  6). In a letter to the Dutch 
Parliament, the cabinet stated that it followed the Turkey-Report of the Commission, and 
that the negotiations would take a long time and a date for accession is by not guaranteed. 
Only when Turkey implements six specific pieces of legislation, Turkey would sufficiently 
fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and negotiations can be opened (TK 29800 V, nr. 61). Whereas 
this position was much more moderate than Bot and Nicolaï consistently carried out, it was a 
founded position, on which consensus could be reached within Dutch politics and by which 
the Dutch Presidency was able to reach agreement among the EU-leaders (Wynia 2005). 
 
3.2 Positions taken up by Dutch political parties  
The issue of the Turkish EU accession came to be only slowly politicized within the Dutch 
parliamentary debate, as it was only in November 2004 that the first debate within the Dutch 
Parliament took place that explicitly dealt with the accession of Turkey. Moreover, a short 
glance at the positions taken on by political parties on the decision to start the negotiations 
with Turkey, shows that the most intensive debate and competition took place within each of 
the mainstream political parties and less between political parties. In fact, whereas the 
parties in government appeared to be clearly internally divided on the issue – only D66 
consistently supported Turkey’s EU membership – it is remarkable that the political parties 
in opposition did take on a clear position of either consistently supporting or opposing 
Turkey’s EU membership. To provide a more in-depth analysis of the debate on the Turkish 
issue in Dutch politics, this section presents a short overview of the positioning on Turkey of 




The Christian Democratic Party (CDA) 
Whereas Prime-Minister Balkenende and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bot – both members of 
the Dutch Christian Democratic Party – were consistently supportive of Turkey’s EU 
membership, other members of the CDA were much more critical towards a Turkish 
accession. However, whereas opposition of the CDA in the Dutch cabinet was mainly 
motivated by religious concerns and some CDA colleagues in the cabinet openly expressed 
some principle concerns about the predominant Muslim population, opposition of the CDA 
parliamentary fraction was predominantly motivated by political issues. In fact, the 
fundamental concerns was explicitly rejected by the CDA colleagues in parliament and the 
chairman of the parliamentary fraction, at that time Verhagen, clearly stated that religion 
should not play a role in the debate on Turkey’s EU accession (Volkskrant 2004a: 2).   
 
Nonetheless, the Parliamentary fraction of the CDA remained critical towards Turkey’s 
progress on policy areas as human rights, respect for – religious – minorities and 
democratization. In the parliamentary debate on the state of affairs in the EU in November 
2004, member of the CDA parliamentary fraction van Dijk stated that whereas the fraction of 
the CDA does not have any principal objections against Turkey’s EU-membership, it would 
indeed oppose the intention of the Dutch government to support the start of the negotiations 
with Turkey, as, according to van Dijk, the time is not right for such a big step forward (TK 
21ste Vergadering: 1219). This critical attitude towards Turkey’s EU-Membership was shared 
in a report published by the Foreign Policy Commission of the Christian Democrats, in which 
it was stated that whereas Turkey’s EU-membership is a fair possibility, Turkey’s reforms 
with respect to the political Copenhagen criteria, still lack thorough progress (CDA Foreign 
Policy Commission 2004). Yet, whereas the report – which was carried out by Member of the 
European People’s Party in the European Parliament (EP) Eurlings – was subject to severe 
criticism and amending in the European Parliament, this critical attitude characterized the 
view of the CDA in the months before the European council in December 2004.  
 
However, after the triumph that party-prominents Balkenende and Bot had accomplished 
during the December summit, it seemed no longer appropriate for the parliamentary fraction 
of the Christian Democrats to not openly commit to the position taken on by the Dutch EU-
Presidency. Hence, whereas the parliamentary fraction expressed its regret with regard to its 
perception that the Dutch delegation made too little efforts to push for the additional political 
criteria that were pleaded by the fraction, the fraction openly complimented and 
congratulated the Dutch cabinet with the December-agreement, indicating a clear shift in the 





The Liberal Party (VVD) 
The other main party in government, the VVD, was also clearly divided on the Turkish issue. 
Whereas state secretary of European Affairs Nicolaï consistently supported Turkey’s EU 
membership, and played an important mediating role during the December European 
Council – stating that ‘a deal is a deal’ (Nicolaï 2004b: 4) – some of his colleagues in both the 
cabinet and the Liberal Parliamentary fraction were not convinced, by pointing to the high 
financial costs that Turkey’s membership would bring about (Trouw 2004: 14).  
 
However, besides clear economic concerns about the Turkish accession, other members of 
the liberal party expressed more fundamental concerns either about Turkey’s geo-political 
positioning, the institutional implications or Turkey’s cultural heritage. In this sense, former 
European Commissioner Bolkestein became the prominent opponent of Turkey’s EU 
membership, arguing that: ‘The Accession of Turkey is important in itself but also for the 
consequences. For if one lets on Turkey, how could one refuse the Ukraine, Belorussia and 
Moldova, which surely are more European than it. Enlargement may therefore well lead to a 
European Union of close to forty members. What sort of Union would that be?’ (Bolkestein 
2004: 5).  
 
Within the parliamentary fraction there were also clear divisions between supporters and 
opponents of a Turkish EU accession. In fact, in September 2004, the Turkish issue was one 
of the main reasons why for Wilders, former MP for the VVD, left the party as he refused to 
support the pro-attitude of his party-associates. Fraction leader van Aartsen clearly moved 
away from the anti-Turkey sentiments, stating that his party did not have any principal 
objections against Turkey’s EU membership (Van Aartsen 2004, in: NRC Handelsblad 10 
September 2004).     
 
Political Parties in Opposition  
In contrast to the main governing parties, the parties in opposition did take on clear and 
consistent positions on Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The parties on the left, the Socialist 
Party (SP), GroenLinks and the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), were clear supporters of a 
Turkish EU accession, arguing that Turkey should be firmly assisted in achieving the 
Copenhagen criteria (TK 21ste Vergadering). In contrast, the smaller conservative parties, the 
ChristenUnie and the Reformist Party (SGP), consistently rejected Turkey’s EU membership 
because of religious motivations. In addition, the LPF argued that the Turkish Islamic 
religion would even enhance the insecurity in the region and eventually in the EU (TK 21ste 
Vergadering: 1233). However, the most prominent opponent of Turkey’s bid for EU 
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membership has been Wilders, who created his own political party (Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(PVV)) after leaving the liberal party.  Wilders consistently stated that Turkey is too big, too 
poor and too Muslim, and not even geographically and historically belonging to Europe (TK 
30309, nr. 6).  In addition, Wilders consistently proclaimed that the Referendum on the 
European Constitution in June 2005 should be connected with the question of the possible 
Turkish accession (NRC Handelsblad 2004a: 3).  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Hence, whereas Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU have led to firm political dissent within 
the Dutch political arena, it is striking that the political debate on the Turkish issue only 
started in November 2004. Moreover, during this parliamentary debate many political 
parties still focused on the question of whether Turkey could in principle join the EU, 
whereas it could well be argued that at that time this question was highly irrelevant. This 
view was clearly expressed by Rouvoet, fraction leader of the ChristenUnie, who expressed its 
regret to the fact that the questions about the borders of the EU and about whether Turkey is 
inherently European were already discussed during the 1999 summit in Helsinki, when the 
decision was made to offer Turkey the candidate status (TK 21ste Vergadering: 1225). All 
main political parties agreed upon these conditions and exceptions by which negotiations 
























4 THE EMBEDDING OF TURKEY’S EU-MEMBERSHIP IN DUTCH SOCIETY 
At the time when the Dutch EU-Presidency was charged with the responsibility to lead the 
negotiations on the Turkish-issue to a successful end, the Dutch government faced a citizenry 
that was rather sceptic towards a Turkish EU-accession. Whereas the role of the EU-
Presidency had provided the Dutch government with important opportunities to put pressure 
on the Commission to take up some serious concerns of the Dutch public in its October-
report, the Dutch citizens did not at all seem convinced about the role played by their 
government in welcoming Turkey into the accession negotiations (Wynia 2005: 4). In fact, 
according to opinion polls from the Dutch public opinion researcher de Hond (2005a), 52% 
of the Dutch citizens were dissatisfied with the way in which the Dutch government handled 
the issue of Turkey during its EU-Presidency. In addition, earlier opinion polls indicated that 
42% of the citizens held the opinion that the Dutch citizens should have been consulted by 
way of a Referendum before the actual negotiations would have started (de Hond 2005b).  
 
Yet, in order to give some insights into how the issue of the accession of Turkey was 
embedded in Dutch society, this paragraph offers an overview of Dutch public opinion – both 
in terms of general support and public perceptions – towards the accession of Turkey and of 
how the decision to start the negotiations was being communicated – both in terms of 
general media attention and the content of the coverage – to the Dutch citizens2. To analyse 
the structure of the public perceptions and the content of media-coverage, it is examined to 
what extent specific frames can be identified that were dominant in both debates. As already 
argued in paragraph 2.2., a first inductive focus on the debate on Turkey’s possible EU-
Membership shows that the possible EU-accession of Turkey has a multiple-dimensional 
character, and both supporters and opponents refer to the same dimensions by when 
expressing their opinion on the issue. In this paper, these dimensions are referred to as 
frames, which, following Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 3), are defined as ‘a central 
organizing idea (..) for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue’. Hence, in 
this paper, I argue that with respect to the Turkish issue, these frames are being used by both 
citizens and the media to understand and make sense of this specific issue. On the basis of 
the first inductive analysis on the issues that are related to Turkey’s EU-Membership, I have 
established ten frames, each highlighting a specific dimension (economic, institutional, geo-
political, political or cultural) and a value-judgement in terms of a positive or negative 
evaluation. In paragraph 4.1.2 and 4.2.2 it will be analysed to what extent these frames were 





4.1 Public Opinion on Turkey’s EU-Membership 
Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in 
the Member States towards an extensive amount of topics, in the form of Eurobarometer 
surveys which are published two times a year in spring and in the autumn3. In the past few 
years the topic of EU-enlargement has gained considerable attention and from 1999 onwards 
special emphasis was put on the possible enlargement with Turkey. In this section, these 
Eurobarometer surveys will be used as main source to identify how Dutch public opinion 
towards EU-enlargement with Turkey was structured, both in terms of their general support 
for Turkey’s possible EU-Membership (4.1.1.) and in terms of the perceptions that Dutch 
citizens held towards the issue (4.1.2.). In addition to the Eurobarometer surveys, some 
opinion polls of the Dutch public opinion researcher De Hond are used, since they provide 
additional information on the Dutch perceptions towards Turkey. A last source of 
information is provided by the results of the survey that was done at the request of the Dutch 
government, ‘Nederland in Europa’ (hereafter: NiE), in which Dutch citizens were asked 
about their opinion towards the EU, and in which special emphasis was put on the issue of 
EU-enlargement.  
 
4.1.1 Public Support  
As it shows in figure 1, in the period between 2001 and 2004 a majority of the Dutch public 
has been supportive of EU enlargement. What is more, Dutch public support for EU-
enlargement had always been around or slightly above EU-average. However, from 2001 
onwards, the Standard Eurobarometer surveys indicate a gradually decline in support and 
whereas the Dutch citizens are still much more supportive of the EU’s enlargement policy 
than citizens of for example France and Austria (European Commission 2005b, Annexes 
QA32.4), from the autumn of 2004 onwards, the Dutch citizenry even seem to be slightly 
more opposed towards EU-enlargement than the average European citizen4. In addition, as 
figure 1 also shows, whereas both the Dutch citizens and the EU citizens in general appeared 
to be considerably divided on the enlargement issue in the period between 2001 and 2002, 
the distance between the supporters and opponents gradual decreased from 2003 onwards. 
In addition, in the Netherlands, the amount of respondents that seemed to be indifference 
towards the enlargement question decreased considerably and in 2005, only 6% of the 
respondents did not know what to respond to the EB enlargement-question, indicating that 







































































































Figure 1: Public Opinion towards EU-Enlargement 
 
In fact, according to the Flash Eurobarometer survey on the results of the Referendum on the 
European Constitution on the 1st of June in 2005, EU-enlargement was one of the issues that 
the Dutch citizens took into account in casting their vote. Moreover, 6% of the Dutch 
respondents even said to have rejected the Constitution because they opposed further EU-
enlargement (European Commission 2005d: 15). This sceptic attitude towards further EU-
enlargement is supported by the ‘Nederland in Europa’ survey, published in May 2006, in 
which it is emphasized that Dutch citizens cast serious doubts on the EU’s enlargement policy 
and believe that the time is not right for further enlargement (NiE 2006: 18).  
 
However, with regard to EU-enlargement Dutch citizens are highly selective and the 
Eurobarometer surveys show huge variations in support for various possible accessing-
countries (figure 2). Whereas in 2005, Dutch support for EU-memberships of Norway and 
Switzerland – who are not even likely to join the Union – lay around the 90%, only around 
50% of the Dutch respondents said to be in favour of the accessions of Bulgaria and Rumania, 
who have in fact joined the EU in 2007. Moreover, among all presented countries in the 
Eurobarometer 64 survey, Dutch support for the accession of Turkey is lowest and lies 
around the 40%, which is even lower than support for countries as The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, this negative Dutch 
perception towards Turkey’s EU-membership is supported by the ‘Nederland in Europa’-
survey that was done by request of the Dutch government, according to which 52% of the 
respondents said to be opposed to Turkey’s EU-membership, even when Turkey fulfils all the 

















































































































Figure 2: Support for EU-Enlargement per country, Source Standard EB 64 
(Autumn 2005) 
 
As indicated in figure 3 on the over-time-development of Dutch public opinion towards the 
accession of Turkey, Dutch support for Turkey’s EU-membership has still always been 
slightly above EU-average and mainly consistent over time. However, whereas in 2000 the 
amounts of respondents supportive of and opposed to Turkey’s membership were almost 
equally divided, the differences between supporters and opponents slightly increased from 
2001 onwards. As it also shows in figure 3, at the same time the amount of respondents that 
were not able to answer the EB enlargement-question decreased, indicating that in the 























































The above presented pattern is supported by opinion surveys on the possible Turkish EU 
accession from the Dutch public opinion researcher De Hond – which were held in 2004 and 
2005 – in which Dutch respondents were asked in-depth about there attitude towards the 
Turkish issue. According to these opinion polls, opposition towards a Turkish accession has 
consistently been around the 55%, whereas only around 30% of the Dutch respondents said 
to be in favour of Turkey’s EU-membership (figure 4). However, similar to the 
Eurobarometer surveys, it seems that as the December summit of the European Council 
approached, Dutch citizens have became more able to express an explicit opinion on the 
possible Turkish accession, indicating that the issue of Turkey became more embedded.  
 


























Figure 4: Public Opinion Towards Turkey’s EU-Membership, Source: Maurice 
de Hond: www.peil.nl  
 
Furthermore, the opinion polls from De Hond provide an overview of the relationship 
between support for the Turkish accession and party-voting behaviour. As it shows in figure 
5, support for Turkey’s EU-membership was highest among voters of D66 and GroenLinks. 
In addition, besides voters of Wilders and the LPF, the PvdA-, VVD- CDA-voters appeared to 
be the most critical towards the possible Turkish accession. These findings can be considered 
as striking, as the political debate within both the VVD and the CDA was eventually geared 
towards a positive position on Turkey’s EU-membership and the PvdA had always been 
explicitly supportive towards the Turkish issue. Hence, with respect to Turkey’s possible EU-
Membership it can be argued that there appeared to be a serious gap between the main 




De Hond also specifically asked the respondents about their opinion towards the decision to 
start the negotiations with Turkey on the 3rd of October in 2005.  As it shows in figure 6, there 
is not much difference between support for Turkey’s EU-membership and for the actual 
decision to start the negotiations with Turkey on the 3rd of October. Remarkably, whereas 
voters of the CDA were rather sceptic or even explicitly opposed to the possible Turkish EU-
accession, they appeared to be in favour of the decision to start the negotiations. Of course, 
this could well be related to the fact that the decision was reached under the Dutch 
Presidency after intense mediating and negotiating of both Prime-Minister Balkenende and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bot – both members of the CDA. This view is supported by 
another poll of de Hond, which shows that 67% of the CDA-voters agreed that the reached 
agreement on the date on which to start the negotiations could be considered as an important 
success of Prime-Minister Balkenende (De Hond 2004d).  
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Figure 5: Public Opinion towards Turkey’s EU-Membership and Voting 























































Figure 6: Public Opinion towards the Decision to start the Negotiations with 
Turkey. Source: Maurice de Hond, 20 December 2004 www.peil.nl
 
4.1.2 Public Perceptions  
In the spring of 2005, the European Commission conducted an in-depth analysis on citizens’ 
perceptions towards the possible Turkish accession (European Commission 2005a). The 
results are shown in figure 7. As the figure shows, the main concerns of the Dutch 
respondents were related to Turkey’s fulfilment of the political and economic Copenhagen 
criteria. Over 90% of the respondents agreed that Turkey must improve its human rights 
situation. In addition, economic concerns appear to be widespread as more than 80% agreed 
that the country must improve the state of its economy. In addition, the Dutch respondents 
did not seem convinced by the strict limitations on the free movement of labour from Turkey 
that were imposed at the request of the Dutch government, or by the argumentation that 
potential immigration can be beneficial to preserving the Dutch generous social security 
system, as 60% of the respondents expressed concerns about increasing immigration, and a 
same amount of respondents did not see the benefit of a rejuvenation of the European 
population. In addition to these political and economic reserves, the Dutch public also 
appeared to be rather sceptic about Turkey’s cultural heritage and the question of whether 
Turkey is inherently a truly European country. In fact, 60% of the respondents felt that 
Turkey does not historically belong to Europe and half of the respondents agreed that the 




































Figure 7: Public Perceptions towards Turkey’s possible EU-Membership 
 
This strong focus on the negative cultural frame is supported by the results of the surveys 
conducted by Dutch public opinion researcher De Hond. As it shows in figure 8, De Hond’s 
opinion polls suggest that opposition towards Turkey’s EU-Membership was mainly 
motivated by a strong belief that the Turkish culture and religion are incompatible with the 
European norms and values and that Turkey is not inherently European. This broad concern 
about the Islamic character of Turkey could be subscribed to the terrorist attacks on New 
York and Madrid, and of course the murder of Theo van Gogh, which all had a negative 
impact on the public perception towards the Islam (NRC Handelsblad 2004b: 9). In line with 
the results of the Eurobarometer survey, a third broadly shared concern was related to the 































Figure 8: Public Motivations behind Opposition towards Turkey’s possible EU-
Membership 






Finally, the NiE-survey, conducted at the request of the Dutch government after the public 
rejection of the European Constitution, also asked about the respondents’ motivations 
whether or not to support a possible Turkish EU-Membership. Interestingly, according to the 
NiE-survey, most concerns expressed by the Dutch public were related to the impact that a 
Turkish accession might have on the EU decision-making process, as 54% of the respondents 
agreed that the decision-making procedure should be changed before Turkey can joint the 
Union (NiE 2006: 22). In line with the results of both the Eurobarometer-survey and the 
polls of De Hond, the Dutch respondents were also concerned about the economic 
implications of the accession of such a poor country as Turkey, as 47% agreed that a Turkish 
accession would put considerable pressure on the Dutch EU-budget share (NiE 2006: 22). 
Furthermore, the NiE-survey provides a more nuanced view on Dutch concerns about the 
cultural aspect of the Turkish issue, as 41% of the respondents agreed with the statement that 
Turkey can never join the Union because of its Islamic character, whereas another 41% 
disagreed with this statement. In fact, a differentiated look at the data shows that concerns 
related to the incompatibleness between the European and the Turkish culture are mainly 
expressed by older male respondents and older low-educated respondents (NiE 2006: 22).   
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this section, it became clear that although in the Netherlands public support for Turkey’s 
possible EU-Membership appeared to be much higher than in other EU member-states, 
Dutch citizens are still rather sceptic towards a Turkish accession. In addition, whereas the 
main political parties in the Dutch political arena were overwhelmingly supportive of 
Turkey’s possible EU-Membership, the electorate appeared to be much more critical towards 
the Turkish issue. It is striking that support for Turkey remains low even when Turkey will 
eventually fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. In fact, this might indicate that the issue of Turkey 
touches upon some principle concerns, which go beyond Turkey’s fulfilment of the objective 
accession criteria.  
 
These concerns become clear when we take into consideration the perceptions that were held 
by the Dutch citizenry. When we take together the public opinion surveys of the 
Eurobarometer, de Hond and the NiE, the following remarks can be made. First, it became 
clear that Dutch public opinion was characterized by a strong focus on the negative economic 
frame, as economic concerns played a significant role in the Dutch public debate on the 
Turkish issue. Dutch citizens seemed to be convinced that a Turkish accession would foster 
immigration and would imply increasing costs to the European budget and did not seem to 
believe in the potential economic benefits that a Turkish EU-Membership could imply. In 
addition, whereas both de Hond and the NiE did not make reference to the Dutch public 
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evaluation of Turkey’s fulfilment of the political Copenhagen-criteria, the Eurobarometer 
survey revealed a dominancy of the negative political frame, indicating a considerable public 
attachment to Turkey’s performance with respect to human rights protection. Finally, the 
surveys offered an inconsistent image of the Dutch attachment to cultural motivations. 
Whereas according to de Hond, the lack of public support for Turkey’s EU-Membership is 
mainly due to the cultural character of Turkey, and the public perception that the Turkish 
Islamic tradition is incompatible with the European norms and values, both the 
Eurobarometer and the NiE surveys provided a more nuanced view, as the latter indicated 
that whereas these considerations are indeed extremely important, such a perception is 
mainly shared by older male and low-educated respondents.  
 
4.2 Communication on Turkey’s EU-Membership 
In contemporary democracies, media-communication plays an important role in processes of 
public opinion formation (Habermas 1990). By reading newspapers and watching television, 
citizens become aware of the issues at stake and the various perceptions that actors have with 
regard to these issues. Hence, in order to understand more specifically how the issue of the 
possible Turkish accession was embedded in Dutch society, it in interesting to identify how 
the debate on Turkey was structured in the Dutch media.  
 
In order to present the nature of the Dutch media-debate and the types of frames used to 
report on Turkey’s possible EU-Membership, I selected three prominent Dutch daily-
newspapers, which offer a representative sample of political orientation: the Volkskrant 
(Qualitative national daily newspaper, left-centrist political orientation), NRC Handelsblad 
(Qualitative national daily newspaper, right-centrist political orientation) and the Telegraaf 
(The Netherlands’ mostly read national daily newspaper, right-centrist political orientation). 
For these newspapers, I conducted an electronic search in LexisNexis, which offers a 
comprehensive database on world-wide newspapers, by using the searching-terms Turkey 
and the European Union for the period of January-December 2004, as it can be expected 
that in this period leading up to the European December summit, the national debate on 
Turkey got to be considerably shaped.  
 
Firstly, in paragraph 4.2.1. it is examined how many newspaper articles were dedicated to the 
Turkish issue, and whether interesting peaks in media-attention can be identified. Secondly, 
section 4.2.2. will focus on the content of the news stories that were published in December 
2004, and will address the question of to what extent a neutral debate on the possible 
accession of Turkey took place. Thereafter, those articles that included a certain value-
judgement – either positive or negative – will be further analyzed to examine to what extent 
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the Dutch media presented the Turkish issue along the ten identified frames (see for 
operationalization appendix 2). For this analysis, I included informative articles as well as 
articles including readers’ opinions, since I believe that in this way both my data-set is 
maximized and that it will provide a full presentation of the national media-debate on the 
Turkish EU-accession. In this way, I coded 162 newspaper articles. Finally, paragraph 4.2.3. 
will go beyond the specific focus on the presence of certain intrinsic frames and examines the 
extent to which the role and performance of Dutch politicians were discussed in the media.   
 
4.2.1 Media-Coverage 
Figure 9 shows the media-coverage of the Turkish accession in the Netherlands in 2004. As it 
shows, the issue of Turkey gradually gained more media-attention. The first peak in attention 
can be identified in September, which might be due to the fact that in that month former MP 
for the VVD, Geert Wilders, left the party because of divisions over Turkey’s possible EU-
Membership. After September, attention to the Turkish issue dropped. However, in 
December media-coverage of the possible Turkish EU-accession increased to slightly over 
160 articles. In addition, as the figure shows, some variation in media-coverage between the 
three different newspapers can be identified. In general, the NRC paid the most attention to 
the possible Turkish accession to the EU, whereas media-coverage of the issue was lowest in 




















































































The content-analysis of the news-stories on the possible Turkish EU-accession in the month 
December provides some interesting insights in the character of the Dutch media-debate on 
Turkey. First of all, as it shows in figure 10, from the ample 160 articles that were published 
in December 2004 and which explicitly dealt with the Turkey-EU relationship, almost 60% 
could be considered as neutral, thus highlighting the state of affairs without explicitly 
referring to a value-judgement in terms of good or bad, or adopting a certain frame. In 
contrast, 43% of the articles did contain a frame – and hence contained a certain idea on 
Turkey’s EU-Membership. In fact, 15% of the newspaper articles was predominantly 
positively framed and 28% predominantly negative. In addition, as is also shown in figure 10 








































Figure 10: Objectivity of the Dutch Media  
 
It is interesting to examine the tone of those news articles that did contain a certain frame. 
Figure 11 provides an overview of the various aspects that were being highlighted in the four 
analysed newspapers. As it shows, the Dutch media debate was mainly framed in terms of 
Turkey’s perceived poor situation with regard to the political Copenhagen criteria and 
recognition of Cyprus, as more than 35% of articles that included a frame in the Dutch media 
was dedicated to these issues. For example, the NRC of 17 December 2004 headed ‘EU 
clashes heavily with Turkey over Cyprus; Recognition obstacle at European summit’5  and the 
NRC of 11 December ‘Turkish Prime-Minister: No gesture to Cyprus’6. Also Turkey’s progress 
on the political Copenhagen criteria was an important issue in the Dutch media-debate. This 
issue has been predominantly framed in a negative way. For example the Volkskrant of 8 
December 2004 (p.6) headed ‘the Netherlands demand end of torture’7 and the Telegraaf of 
20 December 2004 (p.5): ‘Christians in Turkey between hope and fear’8. At the same time, a 
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considerable amount of articles was dedicated to counterbalance these perceptions, as 15% of 
the articles that included a certain frame, was framed in terms of Turkey’s progress on the 
political Copenhagen criteria and highlighted Turkey’s accomplished progress on the 
reforms. Some articles nuanced the picture by arguing that the current EU member-states 
have little right to make any judgements about Turkey’s perceived lack of protection of 
human rights as for example the Volkskrant of 24 December 2004 headed ‘European Union 
hypocrite about human rights’9. 
 
A third important frame in the Dutch media appeared to be the negative cultural frame. 
However, the differences between negative and positive framing of the cultural aspects are 
not that significant as in the case of the political frame. As figure 5.1.3 shows, around 15% of 
the articles that contained a certain value-judgement explicitly highlighted the negative 
aspects of the Turkish Islam or made reference to a perceived incompatibility between the 
Islamic tradition and the European culture. In the NRC of 16 December 2004 (p.5), Turkey 
was considered to be the new ‘Trojan Horse of the Islamic World’, forecasting considerable 
problems with respect to the Western-Muslim relationship. However, to some extent these 
negative images were nuanced by news-items that attempted to counterbalance these 
perceptions, as for example the NRC of 9 December 2004 (p.9) headed ‘Turkish Islam no 
Threat’10, and proclaimed that the EU should be open-minded towards the Turkish culture. 
 






















































































Figure 11: Representation of the various issues highlighted in the Dutch Media 
 
It is interesting to take a short glance at the variations in framing between the different 
newspapers. As figure 12 shows, there are some interesting differences in the types of frames 
being adopted by the different newspapers. Whereas the perceived political and cultural 
implications appeared to be dominant in all three newspapers, and overall these issues were 
predominantly negatively framed, the Telegraaf appeared to be much more critical towards 
these issues.   
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Whereas all newspapers put emphasis on Turkey’s perceived problematic political situation, 
the Volkskrant focused relatively more on Turkey’s progress on the political Copenhagen 
criteria. In addition, only the NRC seemed to have made a serious attempt to counterbalance 
negative cultural perceptions as over 10% of the NRC articles including a frame were 
dedicated to highlighting either positive aspects of the Turkish Islam or to argue against the 
perceived incompatibleness between the Turkish and the European norms and values. 
Interestingly, whereas both the Volkskrant and the Telegraaf were predominantly positive on 
the geo-political implications (with respectively 10 and 7 % of the articles dedicated to these 
issues), only the NRC appeared to be predominantly negative on this specific issue (however 
with only less than 5% of the articles dedicated to this issue). In contrast, whereas economic 
implications appeared to be of little interest in both the Volkskrant and the Telegraaf, the 
NRC predominantly negatively emphasised the economic implications of a Turkish EU-
accession, as the paper for example headed on 17 December 2004 (p.13) headed ‘Fragile 
economy, structural problems’11. 
 




























































































Figure 12: Representation of the various issues highlighted in the Dutch Media  
 
An interesting remark is that the debate on Turkey in the Dutch media was considerably 
framed in terms of the performance of the Dutch EU-Presidency and the divisions within 
political parties. For example, the Volkskrant of 30 January 2004 (p.1) headed: ‘Cabinet 
deeply divided on Turkey: many Ministers against accession to the EU’12 and the NRC of 16 
October 2004 (p.1): ‘Issue of Turkey divides cabinet’13. Emphasis was put on the divisions 
within the VVD, by explicitly highlighting sceptic remarks of Bolkestein and Zalm and former 
MP for VVD, Wilders (for example Telegraaf 3 September 2004). The divisions within the 
CDA were also presented, and emphasis was put on both the supportive attitude of 
Balkenende in the light of the role of the EU-Presidency and the doubts of some CDA-




The coverage of Turkey’s possible EU-Membership in the Dutch media gradually increased in 
2004, and peaked in the months September and December. As the debate within the media 
appeared to be rather neutral, there was a small negative bias. Of all articles that did contain 
a value-judgement, these were generally negative towards Turkey, focusing predominantly on 
the Cyprus-issue and Turkey’s assumed lack of progress on the political Copenhagen criteria. 
The Dutch media also stressed concerns regarding the compatibleness between the Turkish 
Islam and the European culture. Positive value-judgements remained to be rather absent and 
were slightly visible when counterbalancing perceptions towards the negative political and 
cultural threat frame. Remarkably, many articles highlighted the Turkish case in terms of 
specifities in the Dutch political context, like the performance of the Dutch EU-Presidency 






























5 TURKEY’S EU-MEMBERSHIP IN THE FOREIGN DEBATES: A 
COMPARISION WITH GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM  
Dutch citizens were not exceptional in their scepticism towards Turkey’s possible EU-
Membership. At the time when the European leaders decided to start the EU-Turkey 
accession negotiations, European citizens were overwhelmingly negative towards a Turkish 
accession. Among the European governments, only France and Austria appeared to be the 
most consistent opponents of Turkey’s EU-Membership, as the latter even opted for a looser 
alternative for full EU-Membership in the form of a ‘privileged partnership’. However, in 
general, the gap between the government position and the views on Turkey as expressed in 
the public debate, which was apparent in the case of Netherlands, seems to apply for the EU 
in general, as most governments in the EU explicitly supported an eventual accession of 
Turkey to the EU, while at the same time facing a sceptical electorate.  
 
This section will outline the national debates on Turkey in two EU-countries, Germany and 
the United Kingdom (UK), in order to compare and determine the specificness of the 
character of the Dutch debate and apparent problems with legitimizing the decision to start 
the accession negotiations in the Netherlands14. Germany and the UK, since in these 
countries public support for both the process of European integration and EU-Enlargement 
varies and differs from public support for these issues in the Netherlands.15 Given this 
variation, it is expected that this case-selection offers a representative sample of the general 
discourse on the EU in the member-states. For each these countries, it will be examined how 
both public opinion and the debate in the media was structured, in order to determine 
possible differences with the Dutch debate on Turkey and to identify possible problems of 
legitimizing the Turkey-decision in these countries.  
 
For these cases, support for Turkey’s possible EU-Membership is identified by using the 
Standard Eurobarometer surveys (numbers 52-64). In addition, attitudes towards Turkey are 
identified by the in-depth analysis of the perceptions towards the issue as presented in the 
Standard Eurobarometer 64. For the media-debate, a content-analysis was conducted by 
using LexisNexis. For each country, I selected the three most prominent daily-newspapers - 
for Germany: Die Welt, Die Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Rundschau, and for the 
UK: the Times, the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph – which offer a representative sample 
of political orientation (see appendix 3). In this way, I coded 216 German newspaper articles 






5.1 The debate on Turkey’s EU-Membership in Germany 
5.1.1 Political Embedding 
The former government of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the 
Grünen, under the leadership of federal chancellor Gerhard Schröder, had been a consistent 
supporter of a Turkish EU-Membership. In fact, Germany even opted for an early opening of 
the accession negotiations in July 2005. This supportive attitude of the German government 
was predominantly exposed by Schröder and the green foreign minister Fischer and was 
mainly based on the believe that an accession of Turkey to the EU would form a buffer for 
fundamental Islamic forces in Turkey (Stiller 2003: 3). As Schröder argued: ‘a democratic 
Turkey committed to European values would be clear proof that there is no contradiction 
between Islamic faith and an enlightened, modern society’ (Expatica 2004).  The SPD also 
pointed to the economic advantages of a Turkish EU-Membership, as Turkey would 
potentially be a huge market for German exports (Expatica 2004). Yet, whereas the official 
position of the German government was supportive of a Turkish EU-accession, the main 
government party the SPD was rather divided on the cultural based motivations of Schröder 
and Fischer, and some foreign experts within the SPD stated that the ‘civil society’ in Turkey 
might not be ready for a full and early EU-Membership. Nevertheless, Schröder successfully 
kept the cabinet to speak with one voice, and the German cabinet was referred to by the 
Turkish Prime-Minister Erdogan as fulfilling a key role in the Turkish accession process 
(Grosse Hüttmann 2005: 35, in: Giannakopoulos and Maras 2005).  
 
The main German opposition party, the CDU, firmly opposed starting the accession 
negotiations with Turkey. The party leader of that time, Angela Merkel, even opposed full 
EU-Membership, and instead opted for a looser relationship between Turkey and the EU in 
the form of a ‘privileged partnership’ (Stiller 2003). Party prominent Edmund Stoiber even 
went further in his opposition against Turkey’s EU-Membership by arguing that the EU-
accession of Turkey would damage the process of political integration within the EU. The 
opposition of these both CDU-politicians was mainly based on cultural motivations, as they 
explicitly linked the debate on Turkey’s EU-Membership to the perceived failure of the 
societal integration of the Turkish population in Germany (Expatica 2004). Another 
argument of the German opponents had been the claim that after Turkey’s accession to the 
EU, Germany would no longer be the biggest EU-member (NOS 2004a). At the same time, as 
within the SPD, there were also divisions within the CDU, as some CDU-politicians argued 





5.1.2 Societal Embedding 
German public opinion 
Figure 13 shows the development of German public support for the Turkish accession. As it 
shows, opposition to the Turkish accession has consistently been high, and higher than EU-
average. In the spring of 2005, opposition increased considerably in comparison to 2002, 
and lay around the 75%. In addition, the percentage of citizens supportive of Turkey’s EU-
Membership was much lower, and even below EU-average. In fact, in the spring of 2005, 
only 20% of the German respondents said to be in favour of a possible Turkish EU-accession. 
Furthermore, at that time, the percentage of respondents that was indifferent towards the 
Turkish issue declined considerably as only 5% of the respondents did not know what to 
respond to the EB-question on Turkey’s EU-Membership. 
 







































For   (D)
Against (D)
Don't Know  (D)
For (EU) 
Against (EU)
Don't Know  (EU)
 
Figure 13: German support for Turkish EU-Membership 
  
Figure 14 presents an overview of German attitudes towards Turkey’s EU-Membership as 
highlighted in the EB 63 survey of spring 2005. The figure supports the picture presented in 
the previous figure on German public support for the Turkish accession, as agreement on the 
negative statements is much higher than on the positive statements. Both economic concerns 
in terms of Turkey’s economic situation and possible Turkish migration flows, and concerns 
about Turkey’s fulfilment of the political Copenhagen criteria are well-expressed in German 
public opinion towards its possible accession. In addition, the cultural dimension of the 
Turkish accession seems to have played a dominant role as 66% agreed that the cultural 
differences between Turkey and the EU are too significant to allow for its accession. Also, 
60% of the respondents both did not perceive Turkey as historically European and did not 
feel that a Turkish accession would foster an intercultural understanding and respect 
between the European cultural and Turkey’s Islamic tradition.  
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Figure 14: German attitudes towards Turkish EU-Membership 
 
Turkey in the German media 
Figure 15 shows the media-coverage of the Turkish accession in Germany in 2004. 
As it shows, the accession of Turkey gained gradually more attention in the German media. 
In addition, the first peak of attention was in October, which was the month in which the 
European Commission published its report of recommendation on Turkey. In December, 
media-attention peaked again and in this month, around the 215 articles were published that 
explicitly dealt with the possible accession of Turkey to the EU. However, as it shows, the 
peak in October was much greater, as in that month over 300 news articles were published 















































































The content-analysis of the German newspaper articles in the month December provides an 
overview of the way in which the German media debate on the Turkish accession developed. 
As it shows in figure 16, over 50% of the German newspaper articles on the accession of 
Turkey in the three selected newspapers can be considered as neutral. Of the other 47% of the 
articles, 18% was framed positively and 29% negatively. In addition, as it also shows in the 


























































Figure 16: Objectivity German Media 
 
Figure 17 provides an overview of the various aspects that were explicitly being highlighted in 
the 47% of the articles that did contain a certain value-judgement. As it shows, the debate on 
Turkey was mainly framed in terms of negative political issues (23%) and negative cultural 
issues (19%). Articles including the negative political frame put emphasis on Turkey’s 
perceived lack of compliance with the political Copenhagen criteria and its problematic 
relationship with Cyprus. For example, Die Welt of 19 December (p.7) headed ‘Brussels 
compromise in the last minute: Turkey has to make a lot of impediments’16 and Die 
Süddeutsche Zeitung of 17 December (p.1) headed ‘On the flying carpet…..does Turkey come 
to Europe: the road will still be long and difficult’17. In addition, strong emphasis was put on 
the cultural aspects of a Turkish accession and perceived problems with the Turkish Islamic 
tradition. For example, Die Welt of 21 December (p.9) headed ‘Authoritarian traditions are 
not sacrosanct’18. At the same time, both the negative political and negative cultural frames 
were considerably counterbalanced, as respectively 10% and 12% of the articles included a 






Whereas some articles pointed to a perceived incompatibility between the Turkish Islam and 
the European culture, most emphasis was being put on the question what a Turkish accession 
would imply for the integration of the Turkish Muslim population in Germany, and not so 
much in the EU in general. This was also the case when the cultural dimension was framed 
positively (Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 December (p.7) ‘Integration: Turkish community 
criticizes debate’19). This picture is also identifiable when looking at the negative and positive 
economic frame, in which respectively 6% and 10% of the articles were framed. In fact, in 
both cases, the accession of Turkey was mainly perceived in terms of its implications – either 
positive or negative – for the German economy and business. For example, Frankfurter 
Rundschau headed on 28 December 2004 (p.13) ‘Firms encourage EU- accession 
Turkey’20and on 17 December (p.9) ‘Economy grows from enlargment-impuls’21. 
 
Remarkably, many articles in the German media emphasized the position of the German 
CDU-CSU, which took a contrasting position to the German Chancellor Schröder. Especially 
the positions of party-officials Merkel and Stoiber were highlighted. Moreover, many articles 
highlighted the Turkish case in terms of specifities in the German political context, as for 
example the German elections in 2005 (Die Welt 15 December 2004, p. 5) and the call of the 
CDU-CSU for a ‘privileged partnership’ and German political divisions in this respect (Die 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 17 December, p. 1). 
 
















































































Figure 17: Framing in the German media 
  
Concluding Remarks 
The German political arena was deeply divided on the Turkish issue. There had been an 
intense debate between the government and opposition party, in which the possibility of 
Turkey’s EU-Membership was in-depthly discussed on many controversies and issues 
(Grosse Hüttmann 2005: 35, in: Giannakopoulos and Maras 2005).  In fact, the strong 
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divisions between the SPD and the CDU resulted in the fact that the issue of Turkey became 
an important election issue during the Bundestag elections in 2005. In contrast to the Dutch 
case, divisions within the main political parties were successfully ‘solved’ by the leadership of 
Schröder ad Merkel, and were not explicitly highlighted in the media. Instead, the media 
debate was characterized by an emphasis on the content of the Turkish issue, with a strong 
dominant focus on the cultural implications of Turkey’s possible EU-Membership. In fact, in 
both the political and societal debate, these cultural issues played a significant and dominant 
role and concerns were being expressed about both the compatibleness between the Turkish 
and European culture and the specific implication for the integration of the Turkish Muslim 
population in Germany as such.  
 
5.2  The debate on Turkey’s EU-Membership in the United Kingdom 
5.2.1  Political Embedding 
The British political arena was characterized by a broad support of a Turkish EU-accession, 
and both the Labour and the Conservative party backed the December 2004 decision to start 
the accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. In general, the British Labour 
government had been a consistent advocate of Turkey’s possible EU-Membership and played 
a key role in facilitating the start of the accession negotiations at the agreed date (Oktem 
2005). When the accession negotiations were officially opened on the 3rd of October 2005, 
the UK foreign secretary Jack Straw called it ‘truly historic day for Europe and the whole of 
the international community’ (BBC news, 4 October 2005). With this vision, Straw 
underlined the formal position of the British government, who consistently placed the 
Turkish issues within the frame of geo-political issues, political stabilization in Turkey, the 
Balkan and the Middle-East, the transatlantic relations and the global war against terrorism.  
In British parliament there has been no lively debate on the Turkish accession, and even the 
Eurosceptic Conservatives explicitly supported Turkey’s possible EU-Membership (NOS 
2004b).  
 
5.2.2 Societal Embedding 
British public opinion 
Figure 18 shows the development of British support for Turkey’s possible EU-Membership. 
Whereas the UK has consistently been slightly less supportive of EU-Enlargement than EU-
average, it is remarkable that British citizens are generally much more supportive of the 
Turkish accession than the average EU-citizen. Whereas in the EU-25 opposition against 
Turkey’s Membership is on average much higher than support, this picture has been the 
other way around for the UK. In the spring of 2005, almost 50% of the British citizens 
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seemed supportive of a Turkish accession. However, the gap between supporters and 
opponents was not that high. Furthermore, the amount of ‘don’t knows’ is much higher than 
EU-average and whereas this number is indeed gradually declining, it might indicate that 
many British citizens do not have an outstanding opinion towards the issue. 
 







































For   (UK)
Against (UK)
Don't Know  (UK)
For (EU) 
Against (EU)
Don't Know  (EU)
 
Figure 18: British support for Turkish EU-Membership 
 
Figure 19 presents an overview of British attitudes towards Turkey’s EU-Membership as 
highlighted in the EB-63 survey. As it shows, the British citizens agreed with both positive 
and negative statements, confirming the above presented picture that British citizens did not 
have such an outstanding opinion towards the Turkish accession. Concerns about the Turkish 
issue were primarily related to Turkey’s progress on the political and economic Copenhagen 
criteria, as around 80% of the British citizens agreed that Turkey has to improve its human 
rights situation, and almost 70% agreed that the country should strengthen the state of its 
economy. However, positive perceptions were also well-expressed in the UK, as a 
considerable percentage of respondents agreed that a Turkish accession would enhance 
security in the region. In addition, the British citizens seemed to be fairly positive about the 
cultural implications of Turkey’s EU-Membership, as 45% of the British respondents agreed 
that it would lead to a mutual cultural understanding and respect between the European 
cultural and Turkey’s Islamic tradition. British citizens also seem to be concerned with the 
institutional implications of enlargement as almost 60% agrees that after enlargement 





















































































Figure 19: British attitudes towards Turkish EU-Membership 
 
Turkey in the British media 
Figure 20 shows the media-coverage in the UK. As it shows, attention to the Turkish 
accession has been considerably low, and in December only 34 articles were dedicated to 
Turkey’s possible EU-Membership. However, in the months April, June and October this 
coverage was slightly higher, and lay around the 45 articles in the three selected newspapers. 
However, in the other months, extensive media-coverage of the Turkish issue could be 
considered absent. In addition, there are no considerable differences between the three 
















































































A content-analysis of the British newspaper articles in the month December provides an 
overview of the way in which the British media debate on the Turkish accession developed. It 
must be mentioned though that these results could be biased, due to the small amount of 
articles dedicated to the Turkish accession. Figure 21 shows the level of objectivity of the 
British media. Because of the small amount of articles in British newspapers, the figure only 
shows the total amount of articles in the three newspapers and will not differentiate between 
the three newspapers. As it shows, the British media appeared to be rather neutral. Whereas 
indeed, 30% of the articles were completely neutral and another 70% included a value-






































Figure 21: Objectivity British Media 
 
In order to examine the content of the 70% framed articles, figure 22 presents an overview of 
the adopted frames. As the figure shows, the Turkish debate in the British media was 
predominantly framed in terms of the geo-political advantages, as around the 22% of the 
framed British articles included this frame. At is shows, also political and cultural issues 
appeared to be important points of reference in the British debate, and they were slightly 
more framed in a negative way. As it shows, the negative political frame was adopted in 15% 
of the framed British stories on Turkey, and around the 12% adopted the cultural 
disadvantages frame. However, still an almost equal percentage of articles were dedicated to 

























































































Figure 22: Framing in the British media 
 
Since the coverage of the Turkish issue in the British media was rather low, it is interesting to 
analyze the content of British news on Turkey in a more qualitative way and yet, a more in-
depth look at the content of the British media-coverage of the Turkish issue provides some 
interesting insights. As it shows in figure 22, a relatively small amount of articles was 
dedicated to economic and institutional issues. A more qualitative look at the content of the 
articles that included these frames shows that many articles were framed by a similar 
constellation of frames, and highlighted Turkey’s large, poor and overwhelmingly Muslim 
population (Times 22 December, p. 30; Daily Telegraph 16 December, p. 11). However, at the 
same time, this did not imply that the overall tone of the article was negative, as the articles 
also emphasized the supportive attitude of the British government and the geo-political 
advantages of Turkey’s EU-Membership. In fact, when the articles did include a negative 
economic, institutional, political or religious frame, they were always highlighted as 
argumentations of other EU member-states and not of British concern. 
 
Moreover, of the 34 articles on the accession of Turkey, almost half of them explicitly 
highlighted the supportive attitude of Britain in contrast to other EU-countries and the 
absence of British dissent towards the Turkish issue. This could well imply that in the UK the 
debate on Turkey’s EU-Membership remained to be bounded to the geo-political advantages 
of Turkey’s Membership and the economic, institutional, political and cultural 
argumentations that were addressed in other EU member-states, but that did not appeared to 
be important issues within Britain as such. In addition, another interesting remark is that the 
Turkish accession was not framed by the British media as beneficial for the EU in particular, 
but more in general for world-peace and the Western – Middle-Eastern relationship. In fact, 
many British news stories on Turkey also highlighted the interference of the US in the debate 
and the common position of Britain and the US in this respect (for example the Guardian 14 




The supportive British attitude towards the possible EU-accession of Turkey, must be mainly 
understood in terms of the British perception that Turkey’s EU-membership will be 
beneficial for increasing peace and security in the world. Remarkably, this perception was 
shared within both the British political arena, and within the national public and media 
debate. However, it is questionable whether we can really speak of such a debate, as this 
positive attitude towards the Turkish issue has not (yet) been subject to clear public and 
political contestation. In fact, the consensus among the political elites on the advantages of a 
Turkish EU-Membership might even have prevented the development of a societal debate 
(Donnely 2006). As a result, the debate on Turkey’s EU-Membership remained to be 
bounded to the geo-political advantages of Turkey’s Membership and the economic, 
institutional, political and cultural argumentations that were addressed in other EU member-
states, like the Netherlands and Germany, did not appear to be important issues within the 


























6 THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON TURKEY IN THE 
NETHERLANDS: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This paper examined the way in which the political decision-making process on Turkey’s 
possible EU-Membership was embedded in Dutch politics and society.  Some insights were 
provided to the extent to which the Dutch process was ‘exceptional’ and how it differed from 
the process in other EU member-states, namely Germany and the UK. In this section, an 
attempt will be made to connect this analysis to the question whether the Dutch position to 
support the decision to start the negotiations with Turkey was being sufficiently legitimized.  
 
In line with the conceptualization of the ‘Europe in the Netherlands’-project of the WRR, the 
concept of legitimacy inhibits four specific dimensions: results, representation, 
accountability and identification. Legitimization by results, also referred to as ‘output 
legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999), implies that European policies are followed by a certain level of 
acceptance, in that they are both relevant and effective. Legitimization by representation, 
also referred to as ‘input legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999), requires that the electorate is being 
represented with respect to the specific policy, and that as many relevant voices and interests 
as possible have been heard within the decision-making process. It inhibits the question of to 
what extent citizens have been provided with sufficient possibilities to influence the political 
process by mechanisms of political representation. Legitimization by accountability implies 
that political officials could be held accountable for reached decisions. Finally, legitimization 
by identification implies that there is a link between citizens and the policies that are made in 
the sense that citizens can in some way identify themselves with the issues at stake.  
 
In order to outline whether the decision-making on Turkey by the Dutch government was 
marked by certain problems of legitimization, this section proceeds in two steps. First, an 
overview will be provided on the character of the problem, in the sense that the embedding of 
the Turkish issue in the Netherlands will be analysed along the three dimensions of 
legitimization. Emphasis will be put on both the possible legitimacy problems related to the 
content of the Dutch position to support the decision to start the negotiations with Turkey in 
October 2005 as well as on possible problems related to the way in which the Dutch position 
came into being and the identification with the issue. The second step is related to the 
question of what could have been done to come to a more legitimized position of the Dutch 
government, and possible counterfactuals are presented that highlight certain possibilities 
with regard to this question. At this stage of the research, the presented counterfactuals serve 
as indications of how apparent problems of legitimacy could have been prevented, without 
fully examining how these counterfactuals might have worked out. 
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6.1 Problems of Legitimization  
Legitimization by Results 
As already stated, a policy can be considered legitimate when it is reached with a certain level 
of public acceptance, and when the output does not disproportionally ignore the interests of 
minorities. Yet, this level of public acceptance for the position of the Dutch cabinet to support 
the decision to start the accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 appeared to be 
rather absent. Whereas in the last stage of the decision-making process the Dutch parties in 
government were overwhelmingly positive towards Turkey’s possible EU-Membership and 
supported the decision to start the accession negotiations, this view was not shared by the 
majority of the Dutch population, which was overwhelmingly negative towards both issues.  
 
There appeared to be a mismatch between the issues and argumentations addressed by the 
Dutch government and the aspects that were highlighted in the Dutch societal debate. In fact, 
the public debate was obscured by concerns and insecurities that have not been sufficiently 
addressed by the Dutch government. Moreover, there seems to be a broad concern among the 
Dutch citizens about where enlargement ends and whether Turkey fits into this EU. In 
addition, there was a general concern about perceived cultural differences and an 
incompatibility between the Turkish Islamic tradition and the European culture. To some 
extent, these concerns might be related to broader concerns about Islamic fundamentalism – 
fed by terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid in respectively 2001 and 2004 – as Bakker 
(2006: p. 165) has stated that of all European citizens, the Dutch feel the most threatened by 
the risk of terrorism. In addition, the Dutch public seems not very convinced about Turkey’s 
fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, and concerns are being expressed about Turkey’s 
standards with respect to human rights protection, and the perceived economic implication 
of a Turkish accession in terms of increased immigration and excessive costs.  
 
At the same time, it can well be argued that these concerns were not sufficiently being 
addressed by the Dutch government, which seemed to have been drained away in its own 
internal debate. Indeed, as the cabinet was internally divided on the Turkish-issue, there was 
no clear identifiable pro-camp, and the procedural approach of Dutch government of ‘a deal 
is deal’ have even might confirmed the notion of the European train that goes on without any 
reflection. When we compare the Dutch case with the debates in Germany and the United 
Kingdom, it can be concluded that this mismatch in perceptions was not present in the latter 
countries, as in both cases government – and politics in general – addressed the same issues 





Legitimization by Representation and Accountability 
As it was stated, a policy can be considered democratically legitimate when citizens are being 
supplied with sufficient mechanisms of representation and possibilities to influence the 
political decision-making process and when as many relevant voices and interests as possible 
have been heard within the decision-making process. It entails that citizens have to be 
provided with the necessary tools in order to make their views heard and to participate in the 
political debate. In addition, it requires that citizens are provided with clear political choices 
with respect to a certain issues on which they are able to there vote during election-time. 
Moreover, mechanisms should be present by which voters can hold the political officials 
accountable for certain decisions and policies. Hence, in order to answer the question of 
whether the Dutch position on Turkey suffered from any legitimacy problems in terms of 
representation and accountability, it is necessary to analyse the extent to which Dutch public 
opinion was taken into consideration, whether the Dutch politicians provided the citizens 
with the necessary tools to come up with a well informed position towards Turkey and 
whether clear contrasting political views were being expressed on the basis on which voters 
could base their vote and hold the parties accountable.  
 
In the previous sections of this paper it became clear that, with respect to the issue of 
Turkey’s possible EU-membership, the Dutch political parties in general did not appear to be 
representative towards their electorates. Whereas the main political parties in the Dutch 
political arena appeared to be overwhelmingly supportive of Turkey’s EU-Membership, the 
electorates of these parties appeared to be much more critical towards the issue. Hence, at 
least in this respect, it can be argued that there were considerable problems concerning the 
input legitimization of the Dutch position to support the December decision on opening the 
accession negotiations with Turkey. In addition, whereas indeed the Dutch government – 
enabled by the advantageous position of holding the EU-Presidency – was able to pressure 
the Commission to articulate some of the Dutch concerns within the October Commission 
Report on Turkey, the emphasis within the Dutch political arena was consistently put on the 
necessity to reach agreement in December 2004 and to take into consideration the Dutch 
reputation towards the European colleagues. As a consequence, less emphasis was put on the 
necessity to take into consideration the increasing scepticism of the Dutch citizenry. 
 
Despite these suggested problems with regard to the formal representation on the Turkish 
issue, it is also interesting to identify whether the Dutch public was provided with the 
necessary tools to come up with a well-informed position towards Turkey and hence, how the 
processes of politicization and communication took place. In this respect, it is striking that 
politicization on the Turkish issue took place mainly within the main political parties, and 
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clear contestation between government and opposition parties did not take place. In the 
media, these internal party divisions on Turkey were explicitly highlighted, and strong 
emphasis was put on a possible split within the Dutch government. Furthermore, there was 
no clear neutral debate activated by the Dutch government in the sense that all the 
arguments and counterarguments with respect to Turkey’s EU-Membership were equally 
addressed.  In fact, in the media there was a focus on frames that did not coincide with the 
way in which the Dutch government addressed the issue. Whereas various official reports 
(WRR, SER, AIV) sought to provide all the arguments and counterarguments, these reports 
were not sufficiently communicated to the Dutch citizens, and hence, did not find much 
resonance on the public debate. 
 
In this respect, the political and societal embedding of the Turkish issue in the Netherlands 
clearly differs from Germany and the UK. In Germany, one could speak of a clear contrast 
between the formal supportive position on Turkey that was held by the German government, 
and the position taken up by the main opposition party, the CDU, which was rather sceptical 
towards he Turkey’s possible EU-accession. In addition, whereas indeed also in the German 
case, the Turkish issue was a cause of – soft – internal  party divisions, these divisions were 
not explicitly highlighted in the German media, and it seems as if the strong leadership both 
Chancellor Schröder and CDU-leader Merkel, prevented that the divisions became a 
predominant concern in the societal debate. In the UK, there was a broad consensus among 
the political elites and the publics on advantages of a Turkish EU-Membership, in terms of 
international security and transatlantic relations22.  
 
Hence, taking into consideration these international comparative insights, it seems as if the 
legitimacy problems in terms of representation and accountability can be traced back to clear 
specifities of the political and societal embedding of the Turkish issue in the Netherlands, 
where the key-mediating role of the EU-Presidency, internal party-divisions, a depoliticized 
call for awaiting and following the October Report of the Commission and a clear 
parliamentary majority supportive of the formal government position, prevented the 
cultivation of an intense political debate on the pro’s and con’s of a Turkish EU-accession. As 
a result, it can be argued that the avoidance of the substantial debate on the broadly shared 
public concerns, as discussed above, did not only damage the substantial legitimacy of the 
government’s position towards Turkey, but was also highly unfavourable for the input-
legitimacy of the position as such, both in terms of the level of representation and in terms of 





Legitimization by Identification 
Legitimization by processes of identification refers to a broader social or cultural dimension 
of legitimization, and refers to the extent to which citizens can identify with certain policies 
and whether one could speak of a kind of relationship of linkage between citizens and the 
policy or decision that is reached. Hence, in the case of the Dutch political and societal 
embedding of the Turkish issue, it is interesting to examine to what extent the December 
decision to start the accession negotiations with Turkey was sufficiently backed by some 
process of identification, in terms of the social and cultural public connection to the issue as 
such. However, as these processes are extremely difficult – if not impossible – to measure, 
conclusions in this respect are based on the feelings of cultural compatibility and 
interconnectedness between Turkey and the EU, provided by the various public opinion 
surveys on Turkey as presented in section 4 of this paper.  
 
To recall figure 7 (paragraph 4.1.2.), according to the Eurobarometer 63 report, Dutch 
citizens did not seem to be convinced about this compatibleness and interconnectedness 
between Turkey and the EU Member-States as 60% of the Eurobarometer respondents 
disagreed with the statement that Turkey historically belongs to Europe.  In addition, almost 
half of the respondents even agreed that the cultural differences between Turkey and the 
European Member-States are too significant to allow for Turkey’s EU-accession. As shown in 
section 4 of this paper, these findings were supported by both surveys from the Dutch public 
opinion researcher de Hond and the ‘NiE’-survey, as both pointed to a lack of Dutch cultural 
engagement with Turkey and concerns about Turkey’s Islamic cultural heritage. Hence, to the 
extent to which any conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these findings, it seems as if 
there is little evidence for the cultivation of processes of identification with the Turkish issue 
as such, which could well cause problems in terms of legitimizing the position of the Dutch 
government to support the December 2004 decision to start accession negotiations with 
Turkey in October 2005.  In addition, in this respect, Dutch citizens did not differ from their 
EU counterparts, as both German and – to a lesser extent – British citizens appeared to be 
rather sceptic towards the cultural compatibleness and connectedness between Turkey and 
the EU.   
 
6.2 Discussion: How a different political or societal embedding could have 
 made a difference? 
Considering the observed gap between the formal position of the Dutch government and the 
public, both in general support and perceptions towards Turkey’s possible EU-Membership, 
the obvious question arises what could have been done to bring the two more in line with 
each other. One option would involve turning public opinion around. Alternatively, one can 
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consider the option that the Dutch government would have altered its formal position and 
handling of the issue. 
 
Turning around the public: the difference of an ideal-typical debate? 
Underlying the first option is the presumption that a different type of social and political 
embedding could have altered public opinion, and hence, made citizens less skeptic towards 
the possible Turkish EU accession. Typically, Hix (2006: p.10) suggests that the legitimacy 
and accountability of European issues can be enhanced when these issues are being more 
politicized. He argues that political competition allows citizens to identify the leading 
positions taken by the political elites and provides them with choices about rival policy 
positions, which could be seen as a precondition for the democratic process. As shown in the 
previous section, in the Netherlands, the Turkish issue was in fact of a highly politicized 
character. However, politicization took place within political parties and less between 
political parties. In fact, even within the government parties that were assumed to be 
supportive, criticism towards Turkey’s EU-Membership was present. In addition, whereas 
the Dutch cabinet was pushed towards a unified position in the light of its role of holding the 
EU-Presidency during the December summit, sensitive issues that could have caused a split 
within the cabinet were being depoliticized by carefully awaiting and following the Report of 
the Commission.  
  
However, in the light of Hix’ argumentation, it could be argued that these conflict-issues 
within both the cabinet and the various political parties, have undermined the legitimacy of 
the Dutch position. Indeed, the fact that the issue of Turkey crosscuts the traditional political 
left-right dimension made it problematic for the Dutch electorate to identify the different 
positions held by the politicians. In fact, as Kleinnijenhuis, Takens and van Atteveldt (2005: 
p. 124) argue, when there is conflict within a camp that is considered unified, this will lead to 
public confusion about what to think of a certain issue, and hence, the argumentations of a 
unified camp of opponents will find more resonance. Indeed, how could we expect citizens to 
be supportive when even their representatives are divided on the issue? 
 
 
An ideal-typical political debate on the issue of Turkish EU accession would have involved 
two crucial preconditions that seem to have been absent in the actual Dutch debate. First, it 
would involve the main political actors adopting a clear and unequivocal stance on the issue 
and them being willing and able to justify this position. Secondly, it would require a fair and 
open coverage of all possible arguments and counterarguments on the issue. It is by no 
means certain how such a debate would affect overall public opinion on the Turkish issue.  In 
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fact, in Germany both conditions were present, but at the same time public opinion was 
extremely critical towards a Turkish accession. At the same time, British citizens were 
relatively positive towards the Turkish issue, while at the same time both conditions were 
strikingly absent. However, at chance, it could also be that the public would be more 
convinced by a government that presents all arguments and counterarguments. Hence, the 
benefits of such an activated balanced debate are by no means certain. 
 
Turning around Dutch government: the shadow of holding the EU-Presidency? 
The second route to consider is whether the Dutch government might have revised its own 
position to fall in line with its constituency and what room of manoeuvre it actually enjoyed 
to do so. As it became clear, the role of the EU-Presidency put the Dutch delegation into an 
ambiguous position. On the one hand, the cabinet was responsible to act as guardian of the 
national interests and hence obliged to take into account public opinion. However, on the 
other hand, the role of EU-Presidency made the Dutch government responsible to lead the 
December negotiations to a successful end, as the Dutch reputation as consensus-builder was 
clearly at stake.  To some extent, these two roles interfered with each other, and it can be 
argued that the fact that Balkenende held the EU-Presidency at the time when agreement on 
Turkey had to be reached, has provided the Dutch cabinet with little freedom of manoeuvre 
to fully take into account the public concerns towards Turkey and to adopt a more reserved 
position during the December summit. Hence, in this respect, an interesting question would 
be whether a more legitimized policy position could have been developed, when the Dutch 
delegation had not been in charge of the EU-Presidency. However, taking into consideration 
the case of Germany, this counterfactual is also by no certain, as the German government was 
not charged with the role of the EU-Presidency, but had indeed consistently supported 
Turkey’s possible future EU-Membership. However, the analysis of the political and societal 
embedding of the Turkish issue in Germany shows that the government officials led more 
room open for an in-depth debate on the pro’s and con’s of a Turkish EU-accession, and did 
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- Turkey's accession 
would favour the 
rejuvenation of an 
ageing European 
population…Disagree 
- Turkey's joining could 
risk favouring 
immigration to more 
developed countries in 
the European 
Union….Agree 
- To join the European 
Union in about ten 
years, Turkey will have 
to significantly improve 
the state of its 
economy….Agree 
 
- Turkey’s accession 
would be bad for the 
Dutch and EU 
economy..Agree 
- Turkey’s accession will 
lead to immigration 
flows from Turkey to the 
Netherlands…Agree 
 
- Turkey can not join 
the EU, since it is a 
country with low 
welfare, which is only 
willing to join the EU to 
take away EU-money. 
The current member-
states, as the 
Netherlands, will have 
to pay these 
costs….Agree   
- Turkey can only join 
the EU, when it is 
guaranteed that the 
Dutch labour market 
will be protected…Agree 
2.Economic Benefit 
Frame 
- Turkey's accession 
would favour the 
rejuvenation of an 
ageing European 
population…Agree 
- Turkey's joining could 
risk favouring 
immigration to more 
developed countries in 
the European 
Union…Disagree 
- To join the European 
Union in about ten 
years, Turkey will have 
to significantly improve 
 - Turkey can join the 
EU, because this will 








  - Turkey cannot join the 
EU, because it will get, 
due to its big 
population, to much 
power within the EU 
institutions….Agree 
- Before Turkey’s 
accession, the EU 
decision-making 




   
5.Geo-strategical 
Threat Frame 
- Turkey's accession to 
the European Union 
would strengthen the 
security in this 
region….Disagree 
 
- Turkey’s accession will 





- Turkey's accession to 
the European Union 
would strengthen the 
security in this 
region….Disagree 
 - Turkey can join the 
EU, since this will be 




- To join the European 
Union in about ten 
years, Turkey will have 





- To join the European 
Union in about ten 
years, Turkey will have 






- Turkey partly belongs 
to Europe by its 
history…Disagree 
- Turkey is Islamic, and 
therefore does not fit 
into the EU…Agree 
- Turkey cannot join the 




- Turkey's accession to 
the European Union 
would favour the 
mutual comprehension 
of European and 
Muslim 
values….Disagree 
- The cultural 
differences between 
Turkey and the 
European Union 
Member States are too 
significant to allow for 
this accession…Agree 





- Turkey partly belongs 
to Europe by its 
history…..Agree 
- Turkey's accession to 
the European Union 
would favour the 
mutual comprehension 
of European and 
Muslim values….Agree 
- The cultural 
differences between 
Turkey and the 
European Union 
Member States are too 















- Does the news story mention that the Turkish accession will pose a 
threat to or will have negative consequences for the economic 
prospects and well-being of the specific country? 
- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession will pose a threat 
to or will have negative consequences for the economic prospects of 
the EU as a whole? 
- Does the news story mention that the Turkish accession will pose a 
threat to or will have negative consequences for the country’s or EU’s 
job market? 
- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession will pose a threat 




- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession will have positive 
effects on the economic prospects and well-being of the specific 
country?  
- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession will have positive 
effects on the economic prospects of the EU as a whole? 
- Does the story mention that immigration from Turkey will be positive 
for the social security system in the specific country or the EU in 
general due to the EU’s aging populations? 
- Does the story mention that Turkey’s skilled workforce is beneficial 
for or even needed in the specific country or EU in general? 
3.Institutional Threat 
Frame 
- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession will pose a threat 
or will have negative consequences for the institutions or the 
decision-making in the EU? 
- Does the story mention negative institutional implications due to 




- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession might strengthen 
institutional flexibility and respect for subsidiarity? 




- Does the story mention that Turkey’s EU membership will pose a 
threat to the security situation in the EU, due to Turkey’s geo-
strategical positioning in the Middle-East? 
- Does the story mention that Turkey’s EU membership will foster 
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- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession will have positive 
effects on the Middle-East region? 
- Does the story mention that Turkey might offer a bridge-function 
between the EU and the Middle-East? 
- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession might strengthen 
the military capacity of EU, or strengthen its geopolitical weight? 
7.Negative Political 
Frame  
- Does the story mention that Turkey is doing a bad job in satisfying the 
political Copenhagen criteria, in terms of human rights protection, 
democratization etc.? 
- Does the story mention Turkey’s problematic relationship with 




- Does the story mention that Turkey is doing a good job in satisfying 
the political Copenhagen criteria, in terms of human rights 
protection, democratization etc.? 
- Does the story make an attempt to counterbalance claims that 




- Does the story mention that the country’s culture or identity is 
challenged or threatened by Turkish immigrants? 
- Does the story make reference to unique shared European norms and 
values?  
- Does the story mention that immigrants from Turkey have to adopt to 
the country’s or European culture? 
- Does the story offer a negative evaluation on the cultural differences 
between Turkey and the current EU member-states? 
- Does the story make reference to an incompatibility between 
European norms and values and the Turkish or Islamic culture? 
10.Cultural benefit 
Frame 
- Does the story mention that the Turkish accession will lead to a 
cultural enrichment within the EU as a whole? 
- Does the story make an attempt to counterbalance any negative 
images of the incompatibility between the European and Turkish 
cultures? 
Coding N.B. All articles will be coded by counting how much these statements were 
made. On the basis of this number, a value is computed for the frames used. 
However, some articles included more frames, so a constellation was made. If 
there was only one frame, then value=1. If there are two equal dominant 
frames, then both value=0,5. If there is one dominant and some subframes, 
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the subframes are expected to have an equal value. In this case the dominant 




APPENDIX 3: NEWSPAPER SELECTION BY COUNTRY 
The Netherlands  
Volkskrant Qualitative national daily newspaper, left-centrist political orientation 
NRC Handelsblad (NRC) Qualitative national daily newspaper, right-centrist political orientation 
Telegraaf The Netherlands’ mostly read national daily newspaper, right-centrist 
political orientation 
Germany  
Die Welt Germany’s mostly read regional daily newspaper, conservative political 
orientation 
Die Süddeutsche Zeitung Qualitative national (despite of its name ‘Süddeutsche’) daily newspaper, 
leftist-liberal political orientation 
Frankfurter Rundschau Daily newspaper, leftist-liberal political orientation 
The United Kingdom  
The Times Daily national newspaper, conservative political orientation 
The Guardian Daily national newspaper, left-centrist political orientation 
The Daily Telegraph Daily national newspaper, conservative political orientation 





                                                        
1 Which were partly based on a report of the AIV: ‘AIV Advies Turkije (2004) ‘De weg naar het lidmaatschap van 
de Europese Unie’, no. 37, Augustus 2004’. 
2 The analysis presented in this paper is based on research that has been conducted for my Master-thesis on the 
role of the media in national public discourses on Turkey’s EU-Membership (Hollander 2006). 
3 Available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
4 Even after taking into account the fact that in May 2004, ten new countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
joined the Union, which could explain the dramatic increase in the average EU support for EU-enlargement. 
5 Free translation. Original text: ‘EU botst hard met Turkije over Cyprus; Erkenning struikelblok op Europese top’. 
6 Free translation. Original text: ‘Turkse premier: Geen gebaar richting Cyprus’ 
7 Free translation. Original text: ‘Nederland eist eind aan martelingen’ 
8 Free translation. Original text: ‘Christenen in Turkije tussen hoop en vrees’ 
9 Free translation. Original text: ‘Europese Unie hypocriet over mensenrechten’ 
10 Free translation. Original text: ‘Turkse Islam geen bedreiging’ 
11 Free translation. Original text: ‘Fragiele economie, structurele problemen’  
12 Free translation. Original text: ‘Kabinet verdeeld over Turkije: Veel ministers tegen toetreding tot EU’ 
13 Free translation. Original text: ‘Kwestie Turkije verdeelt kabinet’ 
14 Again, the analyses presented in this paper are based on research that has been conducted for my Master-thesis 
on the role of the media in national public discourses on Turkey’s EU-Membership (Hollander 2006). 
15 Data based on the Standard Eurobarometer reports numbers: 55, 57, 59, 61 and 63. 
16 Free translation. Original text: ‘Brüsseler Kompromiß in letzter Minute; Die Türkei hat noch viele Hürden zu 
nehmen’ 
17 Free translation. Original text: ‚Auf dem fliegenden Teppich . . . kommt die Türkei nicht nach Europa. Der Weg 
wird noch ziemlich lang und mühevoll sein’ 
18 Free translation. Original text: ‚ ‚Autoritäre Traditionen sind nicht sakrosankt’ 
19 Free translation. Original text: ‚Integration ; Türkische Gemeinde kritisiert Debatte’ 
20 Free translation. Original text: ‚Firmen setzen auf EU-Beitritt der Türkei’ 
21 Free translation. Original text ‚Wirtschaft setzt auf "Beitrittsimpuls’ 
22 However, some authors claim that contestation on Turkey in the UK will be just a matter of time, as British 
public opinion is quiescent rather than truly engaged with the Turkish issue. These authors claim that since there 
is a broad consensus among the British political elites, there is no political rallying point, and that hence, 
opposition or contrasting positions are not being articulated (Donnely 2006). As Donnely (2006: p. 178) argues: 
‘The possibility at that point of populist opposition to Turkish membership cannot be discounted’.  
 
 
